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| 1 |
ID:
152463
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1898, the United States government took possession of Cuba. Rather than annexation, the William McKinley Administration chose to create a new nation-state. Cuba’s fate therefore was unlike that of the Philippines, waiting until after the Second World War for independence. It leads to a question: when it came to Cuba, why the choice of creating a nation rather than annexation? The short answer is that the Cubans would have resisted annexation by force. The longer—and more interesting—answer is that annexation became unnecessary: Over time, Cuba’s nationalist elite proved willing to co-operate with American interests, and McKinley’s Administration left Cuba in nationalist hands, provided those hands were bound by the Platt Amendment. Historians have argued that Cuban nationalists co-operated because of coercion. Whilst true, Cuba’s nationalists also saw value in a relationship with the United States. Therefore, Cuba’s new leaders resisted American demands in ways not only to preserve the good opinion of Washington, but to prove themselves capable of civilised self-government.
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| 2 |
ID:
152465
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In 1918, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Itamaraty] hired its first female employee. The organisation would henceforth confront the discussion of the role women in diplomacy. Traditional European aristocratic values had heretofore shaped the Brazilian diplomatic profession, and they relegated women to the role of supporting wives. Countering the status quo, those interested in opening diplomatic positions for women argued that the gendered nature of diplomacy was, in fact, feminine and used the rhetorical strength of traditional values to reframe the career. The transition of the masculinity model associated with the “new” diplomacy and the transnational constitution of the acceptability of female diplomats, however, precluded female activists from strategically using discriminatory gender stereotypes to succeed. Only in 1954, Itamaraty opened careers permanently to women.
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| 3 |
ID:
152466
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Lyndon B. Johnson became a senator the year of Israel’s creation: 1948. Moral, political, and strategic considerations guided Johnson’s outspoken support for Israel from an early point in his political career. This analysis reveals that Johnson’s advocacy of Israel whilst a senator foreshadowed his policy as president of championing the Israeli-American military-strategic alliance. Beginning with his time in Congress, Johnson had many Jewish American friends supporting the establishment of a Jewish state and, due to the importance of Jewish-American backing of the Democratic Party, Johnson supported Israel for significant political reasons. From a moral and strategic perspective starting in the 1950s, Johnson believed that Israel served as a humanitarian refuge for Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust and, as a liberal democracy, was well suited to oppose the expansion of Soviet influence and communism in the Cold War Middle East. For these reasons, Johnson supported the initiation of American aid to Israel in the early 1950s, which would presage decisions to arm Israel with the first American tanks and fighter jets as president. As a senator, Johnson staunchly opposed President Dwight Eisenhower’s threat to impose sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw from Egyptian territories occupied in the 1956 Suez crisis. Johnson’s stance on Suez – that Israel deserved greater security guarantees prior to withdrawal – would starkly parallel his policy following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
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| 4 |
ID:
152469
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| Summary/Abstract |
Few grassroots-based coalitions from a “peripheral” region have affected high international politics to the degree of creating a global domino effect. However, the process that led to Brazil’s declaration of Palestinian state recognition on 3 December 2010, followed by regional and worldwide echoes of similar actions, provides a pertinent illustration. This analysis examines the winding road to the declaration, focusing on the domestic circumstances that conditioned this Brazilian policy. Using process tracing and content analysis techniques, it describes how a pro-Palestinian Transnational Advocacy Network grew in its degree of institutionalisation, political access, and popular mobilisation, managing to constrain Brazilian policy-makers’ preferences. The findings suggest some novel insights about the changing nature of diplomacy and the role of civil societies in the “Battles for Legitimacy” that characterise contemporary global politics.
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| 5 |
ID:
152468
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This analysis explores post-Qaddafi Libya as it becomes a failed state, alongside international efforts to mend its internal rifts and restore an effective government and thereby halt its national disintegration. Attaining a modus vivendi amongst the internal rival political and military actors looks to enable a war effort to loosen the grasp of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which infiltrated Libya’s Mediterranean coast in 2014 and gained a strategic foothold in the heart of Libya and nearby its oil ports – Libya’s economic lifeline. An internal agreement looks to rebuild the state security system that can confront the continuing tribal, ethnic, Salafi-jihadistic, and criminal militarisation of Libya, which also contributes to its bloody chaos. This exegesis focuses on the brief but challenging period of 2014-2016 in terms of the threats to Libya’s governmental and territorial integrity, outlining the principal junctures and actors.
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| 6 |
ID:
152464
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In the Spitsbergen treaty of 1920, Norway acquired sovereignty over the Spitsbergen Islands. Rather than Woodrow Wilson, the American president, the architects behind the treaty were Robert Lansing, Wilson’s secretary of state, and, behind the diplomatic scene, the mining investor, John M. Longyear. In 1906, Longyear established a mining company to exploit the coal deposits at Spitsbergen. He induced Congress, the State Department, and the White House to forge an American policy for the European Arctic, including the appointment of Lansing, an international lawyer, as a counsel in the State Department. Lansing was a leading expert on both international law and the lack of state authority at the terra nullius, Spitsbergen. In 1915, he became secretary of State and, at the Paris Peace Conference, decided American policy regarding the Spitsbergen question. This analysis shows how the outcome of the Spitsbergen question was a result of American mining interests, supplemented by Norwegian-American shared interests in conflict resolution based on international law.
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| 7 |
ID:
152467
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study looks at how the widening gap between Britain’s available military resources and its remaining overseas commitments in the 1960s affected its ability and willingness to protect Kuwait after the latter elected for independence in June 1961. It provides a fresh account of how successive British governments addressed the dilemma of providing adequate cover for the Kuwaiti commitment. Over the course of the decade, Britain found it increasingly difficult to maintain the minimum forces considered necessary for forestalling an attack from Kuwait’s principal threat – Iraq. The challenge of providing protection became more difficult by political conditions in Kuwait, which prohibited the stationing of troops, and the evolving nature of the Iraqi threat. British decision-makers increasingly saw the Kuwaiti military as a way to make up for the shortfall in cover and eventually replacing British protection altogether. This move towards self-reliance, however, would prove a failed strategy for Kuwait over the long term.
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