| Summary/Abstract |
Whereas there is a consensus on the significance of rebuilding conflict-torn states and societies, there is no agreement on how it should be done. The dominant framework of post-war rebuilding is clearly biased to rebuilding the ‘hardware’. This article argues that the government’s attempt to rebuild the Rwenzori sub-region in the aftermath of the Allied Democratic Forces war adopted the conventional approach that pays less attention to rebuilding ‘software’. It further asserts that the recovery programme was symbolic given that government wished to avoid the political consequences of not taking action at all. Symbolism not only led to flawed performance of the recovery programme but also negatively affected peace building in the sub-region. The article advocates not only for a synergy of rebuilding ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ but also for a nuanced approach that triangulates top-down and bottom-up approaches at all stages of post-conflict recovery.
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