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| 1 |
ID:
189683
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the midst of Russian nuclear threats in its war on Ukraine and an accelerating global nuclear arms competition, U.S. President Joe Biden and other leaders of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized states will convene for their 2023 summit in Hiroshima, Japan.
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| 2 |
ID:
182595
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Biden Administration has accepted the Trump Administration’s definition of China as a ‘strategic competitor’, and has retained Trump’s tariffs, the ‘Quad’, and the upgrade in Taiwan’s protocol status. But Biden’s China policy is different from Trump’s in being truly strategic. The key elements of that strategy are focused on improving the United States’ competitiveness domestically and in international affairs; cooperation with allies and partners; an emphasis on human rights; partial decoupling of economic and technology relationships; and a search for some areas of cooperation with China. Success for the Biden strategy would consist neither of bottling up China in its current global power position nor in achieving a negotiated condominium in Asia. The Biden Administration would succeed if the United States can maintain its alliance system, keep a robust military presence in East Asia and prevent the forcible integration of Taiwan into China while avoiding major war. Several features of the China challenge make it reasonable to hope that such success is possible.
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| 3 |
ID:
182272
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| Summary/Abstract |
Most successful U.S. presidents have actively led efforts to advance arms control agreements and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Although much has been achieved over the years, there are still 14,000 nuclear weapons and nine nuclear-armed states; progress on disarmament has stalled; and tensions between the United States and its main nuclear adversaries—Russia and China—are rising.
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| 4 |
ID:
182524
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| 5 |
ID:
191046
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| Summary/Abstract |
The conventional view has been that Trump and Biden made the correct decision to withdraw the US from Afghanistan, but the actual departure was flawed. On the contrary, the US should not have withdrawn and the actual departure was not a failure. The withdrawal was against the US’ larger strategic interests beyond counterterrorism. If it withdrew, it should not have done so unconditionally, for both its interests (including humanitarian) and assets were substantial. The US should not have negotiated with the Taliban absent the Afghan government, thereby undermining the government’s and its security forces’ will to fight. Thus, the success of the Taliban’s revolution owed more to the Afghan government’s collapse than its revolutionary mobilization. In withdrawing from Afghanistan, the US showed that it failed to learn lessons from its withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which led to internal political decay in Iraq, the re-emergence of terrorism, and larger strategic setbacks for Washington. More broadly, the US failed to appreciate how its withdrawal of support for regimes dependent on it often facilitates the coming to power of hostile revolutionary movements.
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| 6 |
ID:
179479
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| Summary/Abstract |
Bismarck once said that the statesman’stask was to hear God’s footsteps marching through
history and try to catch his coattails as he went past. U.S. President GeorgeW.
Bush agreed.
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| 7 |
ID:
181580
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| Summary/Abstract |
Grounding U.S. India policy in five key principles can help the Biden administration build upon the efforts of past administrations, avoiding pitfalls that could stymie U.S.-India cooperation, and leveraging opportunities that will advance it.
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| 8 |
ID:
178144
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| 9 |
ID:
185196
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| Summary/Abstract |
The past year was a transition, with President Biden proclaiming “America is back,” signaling a change in the agenda and style of US foreign policy. Yet the Biden administration’s approach in the Indo-Pacific has been one of both continuity and change. “Strategic competition” remains the focus of US–China relations, with tensions increasing and few signs of improvement. Yet, it is imperative that this relationship be managed carefully in the years ahead to keep competition from turning into military conflict.
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| 10 |
ID:
177884
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| Summary/Abstract |
No amount of sugarcoating can downplay the current depth and scope of stress in Sino-US relations. Clashes routinely run the gamut between Beijing’s handling of Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; its industrial policies and trade practices; and its relations with third countries such as Iran. Unfortunately for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the drastic downturn of its relations with the United States has also coincided with the ongoing spats with a bevy of countries, not least the first flashes of violence in decades on the border with India. Coupled with the fallout from the COVID-19 fiasco, China is facing arguably its worst geostrategic and diplomatic environment since the 1970s.
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| 11 |
ID:
181350
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| Summary/Abstract |
FIVE months have passed since the inauguration of Joe Biden as the 46th president of the United States, and in this time, the US has faced a variety of domestic and foreign challenges requiring a quick response from the White House. This response, both on its own but especially in comparison with the actions of the Obama and Trump administrations in similar situations, provides ample material for analyzing the behavior patterns of the new American leadership.
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| 12 |
ID:
174280
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| Summary/Abstract |
During a town hall meeting in the 1992 presidential election, a woman in the audience asked whether the candidates could truly claim to be able to solve America’s problems if they had no experience of the economic woes facing ordinary people.
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