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ID:
174311
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| Summary/Abstract |
Thanks to the high-profile case of the Maersk Alabama in 2009, as well as the significant media attention paid to hijackings and attacks on merchant ships in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa around the same time, modern-day piracy occupies the popular imagination in reference to a very specific place
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| 2 |
ID:
174307
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| 3 |
ID:
174310
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| Summary/Abstract |
The scale and speed of China’s naval construction bear only one conclusion: Beijing is seeking to erode U.S. naval supremacy. This judgment requires no specialized knowledge of China or access to top secret intelligence. One need only look at the platforms the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is building and the pace at which it is building them.
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| 4 |
ID:
174305
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| 5 |
ID:
174308
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—the “Quad”—became an official event on 25 May 2007 on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Manila. The interlocutors were a few rungs below the senior-most diplomats.1 But it had originated informally two and a half years before, when Australia, Japan, India, and the United States rallied to coordinate humanitarian assistance in the wake of the 26 December 2004 tsunami that affected the Indian Ocean littoral from western Australia to the Horn of Africa. This quartet was sometimes referred to as the Tsunami Core Group.
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| 6 |
ID:
174312
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| Summary/Abstract |
More than at any time in recent memory, the Navy faces greater and more diverse threats in the littorals, including long-range aircraft armed with antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), attack submarines with cruise missiles, midget submarines, multipurpose corvettes, coastal missile and gun systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sophisticated mines, and medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. Most notably, Navy surface combatants are now vulnerable to attack, with little to no warning, from small, low-observable guided-missile patrol boats (PGGs) or fast-attack craft (FAC) with ASCMs.
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| 7 |
ID:
174313
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military professionals must be good planners. General George S. Patton Jr. wrote: “A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.”1 President (and retired General of the Army) Dwight D. Eisenhower similarly said: “If you haven’t been planning you can’t start to work, intelligently at least.”2 Finally, some unknown but brilliant philosopher said: “Proper prior planning prevents piss-poor performance.”
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| 8 |
ID:
174309
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| Summary/Abstract |
The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has not engendered a more peaceful or stable world order. Rather, the United States’ post–Cold War dominance in the maritime domain is increasingly beset by challenges. In the Middle East, the U.S.-supported 33-nation maritime coalition has been stymied in developing a coherent response to Iranian aggression. In the Pacific, the United States’ longstanding relationship with the Philippines has grown increasingly strained, a fact demonstrated by President Rodrigo Duterte’s threat to nullify a 21-year-old bilateral military cooperation agreement.
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| 9 |
ID:
174306
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