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ID:
173923
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do intelligence agencies cooperate to counter terrorism and to what extent can it be (ab)used for political purposes? This article focuses on the Club de Berne, an intelligence liaison forum that was founded in 1969 by nine Western European countries and which was also linked to the United States and Israel. This article explores the mechanisms of counterterrorism intelligence-sharing in the early 1970s and examines the motives for cooperation within this framework. On the basis of large-scale recently declassified intelligence records, the article uncovers new aspects in the history of European security cooperation with Israel and the United States, and hopes to lay the groundwork for broader theoretical reflections about counterterrorism intelligence cooperation.
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| 2 |
ID:
173930
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| Summary/Abstract |
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) promises a relatively objective and tractable methodology for ranking the plausibility of competing hypotheses. Unlike Bayesianism, it is computationally modest. Unlike explanationism, it appeals to minimally subjective judgments about relations between hypotheses and evidence. Yet the canonical procedures for ACH allow a certain kind of instability in applications of the methodology, by virtue of supporting competing rankings despite common evidential bases and diagnosticity assessments. This instability should motivate advocates of ACH to focus their efforts toward creating structured methods for individuating items of evidence.
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| 3 |
ID:
173925
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite détente, the superpowers continued their Cold War practice of spying on one another throughout the 1970s. Yet intelligence is largely ‘missing’ from the historiography of détente. Why? Based on newly declassified data, ‘Détente in Deep Water’ reveals the geopolitical calculations behind the ‘Glomar response’ and how that legalese operated to limit disclosure of intelligence operations starting with AZORIAN/MATADOR, the CIA-led project to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine using the Hughes Glomar Explorer, a ship ostensibly owned (under a cover story) by industrialist Howard Hughes. Glomar’s diplomatic backstory sheds new light on the historical relationship between intelligence collection and foreign policy.
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| 4 |
ID:
173924
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| Summary/Abstract |
British intelligence in Ireland between 1919 and 1921 has been characterized as a toxic mix of incompetence and mendacity. This article will challenge this judgement by examining the activities, impact and consequences of a British civil servant, Alfred Cope, who between 1920 and 1921 was an Assistant Under Secretary in Dublin Castle. Using the three criteria of counter-intelligence operations: the ability to locate, identify and neutralize a target, it will be shown that within months of his posting to Dublin British intelligence, albeit inadvertently, had located and identified him as passing classified information to Sinn Fein. Political patronage meant the ability of the intelligence community to neutralize his impact was nugatory. Latterly Cope recognized the consequences of his actions reverberated beyond the period of his time in Ireland.
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| 5 |
ID:
173928
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, government leaks have brought many alleged potential privacy violating intelligence collection programs to the public arena. Intelligence collection can affect the privacy rights of citizens from any country. While the concept of privacy is a complicated one, United States citizen privacy is protected by various policies and laws. This paper reviews these alleged intelligence collection programs, as well as specific laws set in place to protect privacy. Also presented are discussions on public opinion and whether or not digital intelligence collection are providing a safer environment for Americans.
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| 6 |
ID:
173927
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses a claim by Khrushchev that warnings from the Soviet intelligence services enabled to him to deter a Turkish invasion of Syria in 1957. The article shows that the United States and Turkey did aim to overthrow the Syrian government, with the Turks massing an invasion force on Syria’s border. Soviet intelligence detected this threat and was able to alert Khrushchev, who took diplomatic and military countermeasures. However, while the Soviet intelligence services did provide advance warning, Khrushchev overestimated the extent to which the United States was committed to a Turkish invasion.
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| 7 |
ID:
173929
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence products have a degree of uncertainty associated with them. This is typically expressed using linguistic probabilities (e.g., ‘likely’), and some organizations have adopted standardized lexicons for communicating uncertainty. This paper empirically shows that intelligence analysts use a wide heterogeneity of language to communicate uncertainty. This does not include all of the phrases in standardized lexicons used by the intelligence community. In addition, analysts may use some phrases differently to that advocated. Miscommunication of uncertainty can have deleterious effects on decision-making, and so standardization of uncertainty communication should be evidence-based. This paper discusses ways in which such evidence can be generated.
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| 8 |
ID:
173926
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| Summary/Abstract |
From the beginning of Northern Ireland’s Troubles, two different strands of British intelligence were developed in Northern Ireland that failed to effectively cooperate or coordinate their efforts with one another. Though central government was aware (and often opposed) the lack of singular control over intelligence in the province, they were unable to wrest control of security intelligence from the hands of the Army and Special Branch. This problem, meant that a Security intelligence ‘stovepipe’ emerged and that this stovepipe operated without reference (and at times in opposition) to policy initiatives also being pursued by the UK government at the time.
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