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| 1 |
ID:
041914
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House Pvt.Ltd., 1980.
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| Description |
147p.
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| Standard Number |
0706910303
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 022643 | 338.0954/MAL 022643 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
154160
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the effects of government ownership on city commercial banks' lending behaviour in China from the central–local relationship perspective. The case study of Changsha Bank uses an institutional economic framework to analyse, in particular, the credit appetite of city commercial banks under the current institutional design of China's political and economic system. The central government relies on local governments to develop the local economy. Local governments bargain with the central government by relying heavily on city commercial banks as the local financing platform to serve their own political interests. Therefore, dual dependence exists between the central government and local governments, and is also prevalent between local governments and city commercial banks. This study illustrates the fundamental problems that exist within the post-transformation Chinese financial system design and provides guidance for further market-oriented transformation in China's "new normal" economy.
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| 3 |
ID:
177481
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| Summary/Abstract |
We contribute to research on governance of state-owned electric utilities by examining the implications of oversight by independent versus ‘political’ directors for corporate strategy. While policy think-tanks often recommend that governments appoint independent professional directors to boards of state-owned corporations, governments sometimes select politicians who bring a politically-oriented perspective to their oversight duties. To examine the potential strategic consequences, we draw on a novel survey of 384 directors of municipally-owned local electricity distribution companies in Canada, of which about a third were elected municipal councillors and the remaining were independent business professionals. The survey solicited individual director views about strategic priorities, including mergers and acquisitions, business diversification, and corporate financing options. Our statistical analysis of the survey response data finds that political directors, after controlling for prior executive experience and organizational context, were more risk-tolerant on average than independent directors, as evidenced by a greater willingness to diversify into unregulated business activities and to acquire equity stakes in other utilities; but at the same time, they prioritized enhanced dividend payments to the municipal government over re-investment in the corporation, a potential constraint on future business growth.
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| 4 |
ID:
030939
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Documentation centre for corporated and business policy research, 1984.
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| Description |
vii, 105p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 024980 | 338.954/NIG 024980 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
026971
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| Publication |
DelhI, National Publishing House, 1973.
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| Description |
x, 171p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 011502 | 338.74/SIN 011502 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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