| Summary/Abstract |
Article Type: Research note Purpose— This article considers the three summits between the U.S. and North Korea, the reasons for the failure of their denuclearization negotiations, and two ideas—a series of mini nuclear deals and the political assassination of North Korean leader—to resolve the nuclear standoff. Design/methodology/approach— The approach is qualitative and expository: it consults area studies, social science, and journalism; it observes past and current geopolitical events and makes informed policy suggestions. Findings— The Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea ended in failure because the two countries' incompatible demands made reaching a new agreement—not just on North Korea's nuclear program but on anything—almost impossible. Washington called on Pyongyang to unilaterally surrender its entire nuclear weapons program before it would make any concessions, while Pyongyang demanded U.S. economic aid and security guarantees before it would destroy its nuclear programs. Originality/value— The value of this article lies in its explanations of why the first ever two summits between the U.S. and North Korea failed to resolve or even alleviate tensions between these two countries. Every option the U.S. has for dealing with North Korea is bad but accepting it as a nuclear power (mini deals) may be the least bad.
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