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| 1 |
ID:
175930
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| Summary/Abstract |
The game model of the duopoly automobile manufacturers established in this paper takes the carbon emission reduction policy constraint as the research background, and discusses how the electric vehicle and the fuel vehicle compete in the performance of the product in the delay pricing decision under the strategic consumer, which is seldom considered in other related studies. The government gives electric vehicle consumers preferential policies on consumption subsidies and exemption from consumption tax. Additionally, he levies consumption tax and sales carbon tax from fuel vehicle consumers and manufacturers, respectively. The government also supports the development of electric vehicles by establishing charging piles. This paper cast light on how different market structures and different adjusting speed of price work on the vehicle manufacturers' operation and the system's stability. At first, we consider a single period game to derive the optimal solutions, finding that government intervention policies can maximize the social welfare. Additionally, the impacts of tax and subsidy on social welfare are different when fuel vehicle manufacturer is leader. Then, we consider a repeated game where players make decision based on bounded rationality. We compare the optimal solutions and give a numerical simulation for the dynamic process. For fuel vehicle manufacturer, too much energy consumption triggers high emission tax and also lowers consumers' surplus. We also find that fuel vehicle manufacturer acting as the leader enables the system to be more stable than the scenario in the current vehicle industry condition, where the electric vehicle manufacturer acts as the leader.
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| 2 |
ID:
176818
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the environmental issues become increasingly severe, great attention has been paid to the development of electric vehicles. In order to better develop the green economy, this paper studies a supply-chain system under policy intervention, which is composed of strategic customers, the government, two manufacturers which respectively produce electric vehicles and fuel vehicles. The paper aims to research the impacts of pricing time on profitability and stability. The different timing patterns of pricing divide into two game structures, namely Stackelberg pricing game and simultaneous pricing game. With the adjustment of parameters, the state of the system is switched between stability and instability, so some effective methods are lead-in to analysis it. Analytic results reveal how subsidy and carbon emission constraint affect supply-chain system operation, since the whole market operation lasts for a long term, subsidy may always have negative impact on the system's stability, which may drive the system operation to be uncontrollable. By comparison, Stackelberg pricing strategy with characteristics of time-delay is more adaptable for system operational management, which makes the system more flexible to adjust supply-chain system status in time.
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