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| 1 |
ID:
190710
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| Summary/Abstract |
Two years following Myanmar’s attempted military coup, the situation is at a stalemate. Little progress has been achieved against ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus, hailed as a major breakthrough in April 2021. Egregious human rights violations continue, and the military is reportedly losing ground but showing little inclination to negotiate. Facing internal political constraints, ASEAN has requested support from the UN. The Security Council has responded by ‘encouraging the international community’ to support ASEAN to resolve the crisis. The UN’s Special Envoy on Myanmar has for her part declared there is no room for ‘talks about talks’, and that she will focus on alleviating suffering. This commentary argues that the UN should do more. It recalls the Secretary-General’s prioritisation in 2017 of ‘diplomacy for peace’, and his ambitions for the UN’s mediation capacity. It reviews situations elsewhere in which the Secretary-General has exercised his ‘good offices’, through his Special Envoys and Representatives, and observes that the exercise of the Secretary-General’s good offices is typically enabled by a request from the Security Council. This commentary thus explores the possibility of ASEAN initiating such a request, with a view to prompting stronger UN support for ASEAN-led negotiations towards a political settlement in Myanmar.
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| 2 |
ID:
193842
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| Summary/Abstract |
In April 2022 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 76/262, agreeing that every time a veto was cast in the Security Council, the Assembly would meet and consider the matter on which that veto was cast. Since then, Resolution 76/262 has provided the platform for four General Assembly special sessions. Drawing on those sessions, this article assesses the success of Resolution 76/262 according to the two objectives articulated by states at the time of its introduction: increasing the accountability of the Council; and prompting the Assembly to itself take action when the Council fails. In assessing the success of the veto initiative against this second criterion, this article also considers the difference between the special sessions convened pursuant to the Assembly’s Uniting for Peace Resolution, and those convened pursuant to Resolution 76/262. It finds that the latter are not yet being utilized to their full potential.
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| 3 |
ID:
192085
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| Summary/Abstract |
This commentary reflects on the 3-pillar strategy for the implementation of the R2P, put forward by the UN Secretary-General in 2009. It outlines three problems with the 3-pillar strategy. First, fear of pillar 3 undermines support for R2P in its entirety; second, the 3-pillar strategy puts the emphasis on what the international community can do to States if they fail, rather than what all States should do all the time; and third, the 3-pillar approach assumes for the most part that where atrocities are being committed, either the territorial State or non-State actors are to blame.
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| 4 |
ID:
176526
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| Summary/Abstract |
In spite of ASEAN’s perceived inertia, there appears to be domestic pressure in key member states for a more activist approach.
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