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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
173428
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| Summary/Abstract |
We use two major datasets collected by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project to map the international security subfield, examining conventional wisdom about the subfield’s gender composition, theories, methods, and policy relevance. At first glance, articles in security journals appear similar to security articles, in general, political science and international relations field journals on these variables. On closer inspection, however, we find that much of the standard thinking about international security describes only two security journals, International Security (IS) and Security Studies (SS). First, women author a small percentage of articles in these two journals, with little increase over time, whereas a growing share of articles in other top journals has a female author or coauthor. Second, more articles in IS and SS employ a realist theoretical approach, and these journals have been slower to embrace nonparadigmatic scholarship. Third, in contrast with articles published in the other journal types, only a small percentage of articles in IS and SS use quantitative methods. Finally, these journals are more policy prescriptive than journals representing other parts of the discipline. IS, in particular, publishes more articles containing explicit policy recommendations than any other journal. Our understanding of the international security subfield may reveal only part of the metaphorical elephant explored by the blind men if observers do not consider variation in security-related research across different journals and types of journals.
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| 2 |
ID:
173430
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| Summary/Abstract |
Empirical evidence on contemporary torture is sparse. The archives of the Spanish Inquisition provide a detailed historical source of quantitative and qualitative information about interrogational torture. The inquisition tortured brutally and systematically, willing to torment all who it deemed as withholding evidence. This torture yielded information that was often reliable: witnesses in the torture chamber and witnesses that were not tortured provided corresponding information about collaborators, locations, events, and practices. Nonetheless, inquisitors treated the results of interrogations in the torture chamber with skepticism. This bureaucratized torture stands in stark contrast to the “ticking bomb” philosophy that has motivated US torture policy in the aftermath of 9/11. Evidence from the archives of the Spanish Inquisition suggests torture affords no middle ground: one cannot improvise quick, amateurish, and half-hearted torture sessions, motivated by anger and fear, and hope to extract reliable intelligence.
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| 3 |
ID:
173429
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| Summary/Abstract |
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt argue that American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been a failure and that the reasons stem from the American domestic political system. For Mearsheimer, a prevailing form of Liberalism is at fault; for Walt it is the consensus of the foreign policy establishment (“the Blob”). These arguments have much to be said for them but are not supported by adequate evidence because both authors neglect standard methods of verification: counterfactuals, the applications of the hypothetico-deductive method, and the use of comparisons to countries or cases in which the posited independent variable is absent. Examining the arguments in this light brings out weaknesses and opportunities for further testing, highlights the tension between the explanatory and the normative aspects of realist theorizing, and points to other cases in which the impact of the situation is discounted.
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| 4 |
ID:
173433
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| Summary/Abstract |
What drives citizens’ attitudes toward external military intervention in a society experiencing armed conflict? From colonial Algeria to contemporary Afghanistan, conventional wisdom holds that nationalism is a critical source of opposition and resistance to such intervention. In contrast, we argue that the impact of nationalism on views of external intervention hinges on the strategic context facing the target nation. When the country’s principal threat is from the intervener itself, nationalism will indeed reduce support for outside intervention. But when the threat comes from elsewhere, nationalism will actually boost support for external intervention to defeat it. To investigate these dynamics, we use public opinion data from a unique survey fielded across Iraq in 2016 that includes questions about the military interventions against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant by both the US-led coalition and Iran, as well as a potential military intervention by Russia. The results are broadly consistent with our argument, showing that, unlike other factors such as sectarianism, nationalism pushes Iraqis to seek foreign military help from any quarter when deemed necessary for national survival.
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| 5 |
ID:
173432
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| Summary/Abstract |
Conventional wisdom suggests that when women attain high political office they are more likely to act as peacemakers than their male counterparts. In contrast, this article argues that women political leaders may be more likely to initiate conflict than their male colleagues. The theory draws on insights from feminist theory, particularly the notion that gender is performative, to argue that the effects of a leader’s gender on foreign policy decision making vary with social and institutional context. To gain and maintain status in elite policy in-groups, female leaders are incentivized to perform gender by signaling their toughness and competence through initiating conflict. Statistical tests and qualitative case studies of the tenures of Turkish prime minister Tansu Çiller and Chilean president Michelle Bachelet provide evidence that female heads of government in democracies are more likely to initiate conflict than their male counterparts and that this effect is conditioned both by domestic political constraints and overall levels of women’s political empowerment.
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| 6 |
ID:
173431
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article revisits one of the most important debates in international relations theory—that between realists and liberals over security institutions. A test of the realist challenge to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shows realist assumptions were reflected in the institutional form the alliance took channeling American power to provide collective defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union. However, realism failed to resonate with post–Cold War leaders who guided the alliance with a liberal vision focused on spreading Western values via military interventions and membership enlargement. The liberal approach to NATO was based on faulty assumptions about institutions and security, leading to inefficient military operations and costly overextension. NATO risked, by 2020, offering a false promise of security.
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