| Summary/Abstract |
The turn of the twenty-first century brought with it the miraculous economic rise of China in Asia and beyond; American strategy towards the region, denoted by the ‘pivot to Asia’ and acceptance of a ‘Pacific Century’ for the US,1 became increasingly China-centric. Building partnerships, forging security and commercial pacts with Asian countries and enhancing maritime presence across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) eventually became the fulcrum of America’s Asia strategy, with mainstream strategic perception in the United States on China becoming increasingly negative. American focus on alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea and Australia as well as partnerships with countries like India began to take centre stage in its foreign policy outlook, with a goal to limit or check China’s rise. Concurrently, strategic communities in China did not overlook this growing American presence and interest in Asia; nor did they fail to gauge that the rationale behind such American focus is to contain China. Rather, the Chinese began to view these ever-increasing American strategic partnerships in the region as a ‘mini-NATO’ in the making in Asia.2 More importantly, such a view emerged after China, along with Russia and the Central Asian nations, established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a cohesive security organization in Eurasia, in 2001.
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