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| 1 |
ID:
177621
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars have pointed to the period 1958-1962 as the beginning of Taiwan's transition to export-oriented industrialization. Although the Nationalist Party (KMT) had traditionally supported state socialism, the KMT began to oversee economic reforms in the late 1950s, setting Taiwan on the course of export-led growth under a capitalist model. Using archival materials from both the United States and Taiwan, I argue that the reforms resulted from U.S. influence on how the KMT understood the role of economic development in its grand strategy. U.S. arguments succeeded in creating political support at the highest levels of the KMT leadership for a reform-oriented faction in the economic bureaucracy. This finding shows how an aid donor can promote economic reforms even when the recipient is strategically important for the donor: although threats to enforce conditionality may not be credible, the donor can influence the recipient through persuasion.
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| 2 |
ID:
177617
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that weak local governments increase levels of taxation by “borrowing” institutional capacity from certain types of businesses. While many businesses lobby against taxation, businesses that are locally owned, nationally connected, and logistically complex build robust associations that support taxation. These types of businesses benefit from improvements in public infrastructure, so they empower their associations to monitor members’ tax compliance and to pressure officials to uphold their spending commitments. The article demonstrates the necessity of business support for taxation in the absence of state capacity by comparing two Philippine cities that differ in their ability to tax despite a number of similarities between them. The case studies show that tax increases co-varied with business support, and that business support waxed and waned depending on over-time variation in the capability of business associations to discourage tax evasion and to enforce official commitments to spend on infrastructure.
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| 3 |
ID:
177618
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| Summary/Abstract |
Almost two decades after the initial victory of Thai Rak Thai, scholars still debate the forces behind Thaksin's rise to power. I revisit these debates and argue for a more explicit analysis of dynamics over time. I distinguish analytically between the founding moment of TRT's first victory and the subsequent reproduction of its dominance. I argue that TRT's financial muscle was a sufficient condition for its 2001 victory, that institutions merely contributed to the scale of its victory, and that its platform was not decisive. Once in power, however, institutions were instrumental in allowing TRT to complete its term, but more important for its long-term dominance was the rapid implementation of its campaign promises, which created a mass constituency that in turn made Thaksin-linked parties resilient at the polls despite institutional reforms designed to weaken their electoral performance.
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| 4 |
ID:
177620
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| Summary/Abstract |
South Korea and Taiwan have developed very different sets of election campaign regulations. While both countries had highly restrictive campaign rules during the authoritarian era, they have diverged since democratic transition. South Korea still imposes numerous restrictions on campaigning activities, but Taiwan has removed most of the restrictions. We explore the causes of these divergent trajectories through comparative historical process tracing, focusing on critical junctures and path dependence. We find that incumbency advantage and containment of new opposition parties were the primary objectives of introducing stringent regulations under the authoritarian regimes in both countries. The key difference was that, during the democratic transition, legislators affiliated with the opposition parties as well as the ruling party in South Korea enjoyed the incumbency advantage but that opposition forces in Taiwan did not. As a result, the opposition in Taiwan fought for liberalization of campaign regulations, but the South Korean opposition did not.
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| 5 |
ID:
177615
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| Summary/Abstract |
Democracy movements in authoritarian regimes usually fail and are repressed, but they may still affect attitudes and norms of participants and bystanders. We exploit several features of a student movement to test for enduring effects of social movements on democratic attitudes. College students were the core of the movement and had wide exposure to the ideas and activities of the movement, as well as the suppression of the movement. College-bound high school students had limited exposure to the movement and its activities. Time of college entry could in theory be manipulated and endogenous, so we also use birthdate as an exogenous instrument for enrollment year. Applying a fuzzy regression discontinuity, we test for the impact of exposure to the movement on long-term attitudes. We find significant attitudinal differences between those in college during the movement, and those who started college post-movement. These results are strongest for alumni of the four universities that were most connected to the movement.
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| 6 |
ID:
177622
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| Summary/Abstract |
The contention over the quantity and quality of regional missile defenses forward-deployed by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region animates much of the US–China disagreement about strategic stability. The Chinese argue that the deployed assets exceed reasonable defensive requirements and suggest that if these missile-defense deployments continue, they will be forced to increase the size of their nuclear arsenal. In disagreement, the United States claims that regional missile defenses are defensive by design, limited in scope, and necessary to defeat a North Korean missile campaign. In this article, a series of simulation experiments were developed to empirically test these opposing arguments over missile defenses and strategic stability. The simulations indicate that current deployments are necessary for defense and proportional to the threat. The analysis also argues that current deployments do not possess the ability to alter the US–China strategic nuclear balance significantly. The article concludes with a discussion of other subjective aspects of national security that may explain Chinese concerns and explore possible ways to reassure China.
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| 7 |
ID:
177619
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| Summary/Abstract |
Teri Caraway's very insightful paper asks us to re-think the extent to which institutions played a significant role in the electoral victories of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party (and their subsequent incarnations). Arguing against the so-called “institutionalists,” Caraway argues that constitutional and electoral rules did not matter in generating TRT's victory, but rather had temporal and nuanced effects. First, they mattered in terms of the magnitude of TRT's 2001 electoral win but did not explain the electoral results in and of themselves. Second, institutions helped consolidate TRT's power and were crucial in enabling the party to successfully implement its programmatic platform and therefore solidify a very loyal mass base. But once a mass base became consolidated in support of TRT, institutional engineering was subsequently less effective in shaping electoral outcomes. What Caraway most crucially shows is that one has to break down the causal effect of institutions temporally and draw a distinction between their role in a founding (and “unsettled”) moment, and then as mechanisms of reproduction.
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| 8 |
ID:
177616
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 2016 presidential contest is widely considered as the first “social media election” in the Philippines. At the same time, it remains unclear if or how social media helped Rodrigo Duterte mobilize voters to gain victory. There are three main social media campaigning models: broadcast, grassroots, and self-actualizing. Analysis of twenty million activities and 39,942 randomly sampled comments across the official Facebook pages of key presidential candidates supports the grassroots model as Duterte's profile was the most engaged, even if Duterte himself was not actively engaged. Such inconsistencies raise the prospect that Duterte's online prominance was fabricated by paid trolls and fake accounts. Instead, our analysis suggests that Duterte's digital fanbase was, at least in part, a reflection of offline, grassroots political support. In particular, data from an original survey of 621 respondents suggests that Duterte supporters were not only aggressive in their support for Duterte online, they were also more committed to him offline as well. These findings add to a growing literature on social media and politics that seeks to understand the broader ecosystem of online political discourse, rather than focusing on the actions and strategies of political campaigns. They also underscore the fine line between fabricated support and genuine political fervor.
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