| Summary/Abstract |
Grounded in 41 semi-structured interviews, this article examines the extent to which the complaints system under regulatory oversight of the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) in Thailand has been effective for addressing corruption complaints. The present article revisits the theoretical arguments of the structural school and the reputational school over agency independence, deploying such arguments to analyze the way in which de facto independence of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) operating in a highly politicized environment can be protected. The analysis finds that a high level of legal independence is the best possible way to safeguard de facto independence, enhancing the overall effectiveness of the ACAs working in highly politicized countries. In addition, the empirical findings suggest that a low level of legal independence, a lack of prosecution power, inadequate qualified staffing, and the absence of meaningful public participation are the core factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of the PACC system.
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