| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
178592
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
183771
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Biden administration’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific is driven by three major endeavors: balancing, order-building, and management of competition with China. The US is currently enhancing its balancing act by leveraging its alliance with Australia epitomized by AUKUS and the Enhanced Force Posture Cooperation launched by AUSMIN. Order-building advanced by the Quad is promoting three functions: regional public goods provision, mutual resilience enhancement, and standard-setting for critical and emerging technologies. The Biden administration is attempting to pursue “responsible competition” with China, but its ultimate goals remain undefined. Based on these observations, the article will conclude by pointing out major tasks that lie ahead for the Biden administration in these areas.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
180438
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 1985, North Korea acceded to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which, in theory, meant it had forsaken nuclear weapons. In January 1992, it signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with South Korea, thus committing both countries not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” By the end of that year, however, there were growing concerns about Pyongyang’s ambitions that in time proved all too real and spurred a decades-long push for increasingly stricter sanctions and some kind of negotiated solution.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
190194
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
179472
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
178591
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
178596
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
178587
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
183790
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s cordial relations with the Biden administration and relatively muted posture during nuclear negotiations in Vienna raise questions about whether his government is pursuing a different strategy towards Iran than did his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. This article argues that it is not. Despite reinvigorated Israeli debates critical of Netanyahu’s policies and improved atmospherics with the American government, official Israeli policy remains essentially unchanged. The Israeli government is still wary of nuclear diplomacy, offers few alternatives to continued diplomatic and economic pressure, and views military options as viable even if they can only set back Iran’s nuclear programme temporarily. While Bennett wants to avoid open confrontation with Washington, Israel will not relax tensions with Iran, particularly in non-nuclear arenas like Syria. In the past, Israeli sabotage against Iran’s nuclear assets subsided in the run-up to and after the nuclear agreement; this time around, Israel may not feel so constrained.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
180575
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
180588
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
181598
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Is the moment propitious for a return to an older containment doctrine that might serve as the animating spirit of the Biden administration?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|