| Summary/Abstract |
British and Italian representatives signed a series of accords, commonly called the Easter Accords, on 16 April 1938. The various agreements aimed to settle several outstanding issues between the two governments and, on the surface, it appeared that both Powers had committed to observe the status quo in the Mediterranean. Two years later, however, fascist Italy and Britain were at war. This analysis argues that Italian foreign policy had three over-arching goals that led Rome to sign the Accords. It wanted to secure definitive British de jure recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and recognition that Italy was an equal empire with rights in the Mediterranean and Red Sea basins. Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, wanted to isolate France from its potential British ally. Italian diplomats and officials also thought that they could use the negotiations to weaken the influence of Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary. The limited, tactical scope of Italian policy meant little chance existed of reaching a genuine rapprochement.
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