| Summary/Abstract |
Myanmar (Burma) from 2007 to 2020 observed a short-lived détente with major Western governments after decades of ostracism. Armed conflict and mass atrocities worsened despite significant democratisation. The article outlines Myanmar's short-lived democratic rule from beginning to end, before its coup d'etat in early 2021 and acceleration to state failure by the time of writing. This article assesses the strengths and limitations of Western human rights diplomacy vis-à-vis Myanmar during this 14-year frame, using in-depth interviews with former/working diplomats and experts as primary sources, in addition to secondary sources. Ostracism dominated Western bilateralism pre-2011, followed by the principled engagement of Australia, Norway and the UNSG's good offices, the latter based on Articles 98 and 99 of the UN Charter. Myanmar's military democratised with the aim of counterbalancing overdependence on China and seeking legitimacy as reformers. A reverse trend was observed after the 2016 Rohingya crisis. It demonstrates the dangers of neglecting the law of diminishing returns through advocacy, and of conflating domestic democracy and human rights advocates as principled practitioners. It concludes that it is in the pragmatic interests of Western governments to coordinate and institutionalise human rights principles in longer-term foreign policymaking, and that democratisation before peacebuilding increases state fragility.
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