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ID:
178108
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan introduced a single-district closed-list proportional electoral system in 2007. Despite similar rules, the relationship between MPs and their constituencies differs: while the reform fostered nationwide representation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan’s MPs maintained a local, personalised representation style. This article explores how similar electoral rules lead to divergent outcomes under diverse party systems. Based on legal documents and 25 original interviews, the article provides two in-depth accounts of how electoral rules interacted with institutional counterincentives to guide the representative behaviour of MPs. The analysis covers the effects on MPs’ re-election strategies and the organisation of constituency service within factions.
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| 2 |
ID:
178105
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article reports on a follow-up of a case study conducted in 1998–1999 investigating the rules governing the behaviour of Russian forest enterprises. The new study, carried out in 2011–2012, used the same survey in interviews with a subset of the enterprises that took part in the original investigation. The objective was to see whether enterprises’ behaviour and the rules governing their behaviour had become more market efficient since our original study. The new study showed that, over a ten-year period, the behaviour of the surveyed enterprises became better adapted to rules governing a modern market economy. However, many traits of the virtual economy remained.
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| 3 |
ID:
178101
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of the Russian Presidential Administration (‘the Kremlin’). Borrowing from the literature on institutional presidencies and institutional approaches to authoritarianism, I argue that the administration institutionalised over the years of study, 1994–2012. More stable and predictable procedures enhanced administrative presidential powers but personalism and non-compliance with presidential orders remained. Original data on budget, staff, units, organisational structure and presidential assignments demonstrate that presidential power ought to be conceptualised as a polymorphous phenomenon that varies depending on the level of analysis. Researchers should refrain from over-personalising accounts of authoritarian regimes at the expense of more structural, organisational elements such as ‘institutional presidencies’.
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| 4 |
ID:
178099
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the role of the ‘global market’ in the exacerbation of economic remoteness in rural Ukraine. Based on a case study of a UK-sponsored project that set up a sewing centre in a rural community in Odesa province, I explore how unequal access to the global economy is determined by the type of market sought and the type of product designated for production. The approach looks critically at ‘the market’—as both a Western-oriented ideological construct and set of practices—that serves to distance the community from centres of global economic importance, both in a temporal and spatial sense.
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| 5 |
ID:
178098
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article draws on social movement theory to understand collective action against corruption in Hungary. While offering a perspective on anti-corruption activism, the article demonstrates its limits against a set of unfavourable factors. Our enquiry reveals that the political context in which anti-corruption activism develops, that is, Hungary under Viktor Orbán, critically affects its mobilising potential. Closed political opportunities prompt anti-corruption activists to adopt outsider strategies; moreover, they shape the contentious content and resonance of their discourses. Overall, our interviews with prominent anti-corruption activists reveal the limited outcomes of collective action in this field.
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| 6 |
ID:
178110
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article presents a history of the policy of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) towards state owned enterprises (SOEs). Despite an evident embrace of markets from the early 1990s, the VCP has resisted formal political change. The state sector has retained a privileged economic and political position. Policy has been made in the context of a political order where the interests of certain groups within the ostensibly hierarchical state have usually prevailed over attempts to generate coherent economic strategy. This has resulted in a situation where the formal ownership of SOEs is unclear, and real ownership is vested, apparently, in groups within a State Business Interest.
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