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GURANTZ, RON
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
188348
Does punishment work? Selection effects in air power theory
/ Gurantz, Ron
Gurantz, Ron
Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract
Air power theory initially proposed that punitive attacks against civilian targets could force enemies to surrender. The current literature, however, has largely concluded that conventional bombing is ineffective as punishment. I argue that this is the result of a selection effect. By focusing only on high-profile bombing campaigns, the theory has drawn its conclusions from cases where punishment is likely to fail. This contrasts with deterrence theory, which has analyzed diplomacy in the shadow of nuclear punishment. Air power theory should follow this model by examining how the threat of bombing has influenced diplomacy and broader patterns of international politics.
Key Words
Air Power Theory
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2
ID:
180457
Was Airpower “Misapplied” in the Vietnam War? reassessing Signaling in Operation Rolling Thunder
/ Gurantz, Ron
Gurantz, Ron
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
Operation Rolling Thunder’s failure has been widely blamed on the strategy of using force to send “signals.” It discredited the associated theory of coercion among a generation of military officers and scholars. In this paper I show that, whatever its other failures, Operation Rolling Thunder did successfully signal a threat. I rely on the latest research to demonstrate that Hanoi believed the bombing would eventually inflict massive destruction. I also show that Washington accurately ascribed the failure of the threat to North Vietnam’s resolve and continued the operation for reasons other than signaling. These findings show that Operation Rolling Thunder can be productively understood as an exercise in both signaling and countersignaling. Rather than discrediting the theory of coercion, these findings modify it. They show that failed threats can be informative and that coercive campaigns can become prolonged for reasons other than a lack of credibility.
Key Words
Vietnam War
;
Airpower
;
Operation Rolling Thunder
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