| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
177821
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The prospect of U.S. military involvement in a regional war looms large in Chinese naval strategy. This article examines the Chinese Navy’s evolving role in countering U.S. military intervention in a conflict over Chinese-claimed offshore islands. This role has both wartime and peacetime aspects. In peacetime, the PLA Navy serves a deterrence function, demonstrating China’s ability and resolve to fight the U.S. military if the U.S. were to intervene. In wartime, the operations of the PLA Navy would sit at the heart of any maritime campaign, helping to achieve China’s territorial objectives in spite of U.S. involvement.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
177819
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Military Commission launched a major reorganization of the entire People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in early 2016, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has followed up with its own reforms at all levels. In February 2016, the changes entailed ‘above the neck’ reforms at PLAAF Headquarters and reduced the number of Military Region Air Force Headquarters from 7 to 5, renaming them Theatre Command Air Forces. Changes in 2017 focused on ‘below the neck’ reforms by creating a ‘base-brigade’ structure by reforming several command posts into bases; abolishing fighter, fighter-bomber, and ground attack aircraft air divisions; replacing air regiments with brigades; as well as changing the name of its former 15th Airborne Corps to Airborne Corps. Whilst the PLA leadership has moved ahead with pushing the PLAAF towards becoming a modern air force with enhanced aerial power alongside greater interoperability with the other PLA services, the reconstitution of its organizations has nevertheless led to a fallout due to policy changes concerning its rank-and-file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
177816
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
A slew of structural changes to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) combat capabilities, deterrence as well as military operations other than war (MOOTW) were enacted following the announcement to streamline China’s armed forces in September 2015. Primarily driven by the Chinese military leadership’s desire to resolve longstanding shortcomings in the PLA’s ability to conduct combined arms and joint operations, unprecedented changes in the form of so-called ‘below the neck’ reforms gathered pace since the end of 2016. By focusing on those changes to the PLA’s established service branches as well as ‘new types’ of forces, this brief introduction will provide a summary of the prospects and problems as the Chinese military embarks on its latest endeavour to modernize itself.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
177818
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After ‘below the neck’ reforms of operational units in 2017, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army remains the PLA’s largest service as China seeks to develop forces with increased joint capabilities in the maritime, air, and space/cyber domains. The Army is expanding its ‘new-type combat forces,’ such as Special Operations, helicopter, long-range rocket, and electronic warfare units, to contribute to maritime operations as well as to land missions. It has standardised the structure of group armies and formed new combined arms brigades and battalions. Reform has affected nearly every Army unit resulting in a short-term decline in large-scale training and operational readiness as newly organised units focus on individual and small unit functional training. Senior PLA leaders acknowledge numerous shortcomings in Chinese military capabilities and are cautious about initiating combat operations, preferring instead to achieve China’s objectives through deterrence or actions below the threshold of lethal military force.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
177820
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) will enhance the Chinese military’s future deterrence and war-fighting capabilities. Established in December 2015, this new force is poised to leverage synergies and the integration of critical capabilities across space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The PLASSF will support joint operations and provide new strategic capabilities to complement the PLA’s existing arsenal. In any future conflict scenarios, the PLASSF will play an integral role in the PLA’s quest to ‘fight and win’ wars. Looking forward, the PLASSF may also become a critical force for innovation as the PLA prepares for future warfare.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|