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| 1 |
ID:
177812
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| Summary/Abstract |
There has been much controversy about the effectiveness of military command in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contributing to these debates, this article examines the changing character of twenty-first century command through the example of Operation Moshtarak. Mostharak was a major operation conducted to secure Kandahar City in 2009–10 by Combined Joint Task Force-6, commanded by Major-General Nick Carter, that acted as the International Security Assistance Force’s Regional Command (South) in this period. The paper explores Carter’s distinctive decision-making method during this campaign to argue that Carter exemplifies a more collective method of command than typically adopted in the twentieth century.
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| 2 |
ID:
177813
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper analyzes the complexity of coalition warfare in the twenty-first century through the prism of the British Army’s experiences in Multi-National Division South East (MND SE) and Basra in the Iraq War. Considered as a case study, this range of operations encompasses a range of experiences, from breakdowns in dealing with shifting national interests and aims and linkages to PJHQ, to working within a coalition with the US and Iraq and communicating shifting national interests, to demonstrating a clear understanding of the character of the war in which MND SE was engaged.
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| 3 |
ID:
177814
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| Summary/Abstract |
Two examples from recent British campaigns, the first from the Falklands War of 1982 and the second from the Iraq War of 2003, are used to consider attempts by civilian policy-makers to influence the conduct of ongoing military operations as a result of frustration with slow progress. Both cases highlight the importance of the higher command structures as providing a buffer between the government and local field commanders, and show the problems that can result when key strategic questions are left unanswered in the run-up to a campaign.
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| 4 |
ID:
177811
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| Summary/Abstract |
Contemporary debates on Russian nuclear strategy focus on making sense of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, signalling and nuclear declarations. This paper argues that understanding how nuclear capabilities and strategy interact with conventional capabilities is fundamental to understanding nuclear strategy. It offers the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis for explaining change in Russia’s nuclear strategy after the Cold War. It shows how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been affected by perceived conventional vulnerabilities, and how the orthodox Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of ‘escalating to de-escalate’ comes short of explaining when Russia would go nuclear in conflict, and why.
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| 5 |
ID:
177815
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| Summary/Abstract |
Theo Farrell has written an outstanding if pain-filled book. Painful, not only because he narrates the costs of the Afghan war in lives and treasure, but because Unwinnable is a study of strategic failure.
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