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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
176604
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| Summary/Abstract |
The existing literature identifies campaigns as an important tool of policy implementation for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, scholars have yet to reach agreement about the effects of campaigns on policy outcomes. This article helps to provide answers through an analysis of an affordable housing campaign adopted by the central government between 2011 and 2015. My findings are confirmed using regression analysis of a large original data set that I compiled. The article finds that the campaign strengthened the political incentives for local officials and that they responded to the campaign by building more affordable housing. But the campaign’s effects varied across different types of localities, which led to a significant mismatch between the allocation of government resources and the actual needs of local residents. These findings point to the defects of campaign-style implementation and China’s need for more institutionalized mechanisms to implement policies prioritized by the national government.
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| 2 |
ID:
176605
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using nationwide household survey data for 2002 and 2013, we investigate how widely Chinese household incomes had caught up to those of the middle class in the developed world by 2013, the year Xi Jinping came to power. Based on the living standards of the middle-income class in the European Union as our standard of comparison, we estimate that China’s “global middle class” with a similar living standard grew rapidly after 2002, reaching 254 million in 2013. We project that it had grown further to over 450 million by 2018. We describe the characteristics of this middle class, which is predominately urban, largely resides in China’s eastern region, and mainly depends on a wage income. A distinct business middle class exists but is relatively small. Analysis of the chances of attaining a middle-class income reveals the importance of an individual’s circumstances at birth. Parents’ education and occupation matter, and being born with an urban registration (hukou) provides a large advantage. For those born with a rural hukou, the most effective pathways to the middle class are migration and, if possible, obtaining an urban hukou.
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| 3 |
ID:
176601
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| Summary/Abstract |
All supreme CCP leaders encounter an inherent contradiction between maintaining a necessary level of power sharing (collective leadership) while ensuring their own effective control over overall Party politics. This article uses case studies of the formation of the Eighteenth and the Nineteenth Central Military Commissions, as well as of the Nineteenth Politburo Standing Committee, to decipher how Xi Jinping has handled the contradiction by establishing his personal domination while attaining a degree of subtle grouping balance in the CCP/PLA leadership.
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| 4 |
ID:
176603
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drawing on insights from recent economic theories of incomplete contracts, we develop a theoretical model on authority relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy by conceptualizing the allocation of control rights in goal setting, inspections, and provision of incentives among the principal, supervisor, and agents. Variations in the allocation of these control rights give rise to different modes of governance and entail distinct behavioral implications among the parties. The proposed model provides a unified framework and a set of analytical concepts to examine different governance structures, varying authority relationships, and the specific principal-agent problems entailed in a bureaucratic setting. We will illustrate this through a case study of authority relationships and ensuing behavioral patterns in the environmental protection arena over a five-year cycle of policy implementation.
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| 5 |
ID:
176602
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| Summary/Abstract |
On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC, and it scrutinizes cases of corruption and malfeasance in coordination with relevant departments. The most important aspects of this process are “placing a case on file” (li’an) and “detention” (liuzhi). This article seeks to throw light on the CDI’s investigation process through extensive fieldwork carried out in County J.
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