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| 1 |
ID:
181299
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent journalistic revelations regarding the metadata collection practices of the Israel Security Agency (Shabak, ISA, or Shin bet), coupled with the public attention to the government’s initiative to harness these powers to identify citizens who came into close contact with coronavirus carriers, could have sparked Israel’s own “Snowden moment,” resolving in a comprehensive reform of its online surveillance legal regime. This article argues that the adamant stand taken by parliamentary and judicial oversight bodies to counter the government’s coronavirus-related surveillance should have been also addressed to tackle the new information regarding the ISA’s database retaining communications data of Israeli residents that has been collected for nearly twenty years.
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| 2 |
ID:
181298
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| Summary/Abstract |
This discussion examines how security and counterintelligence vetting practices vary across domains and how this informs our understanding of counterintelligence disciplines. Organizations in each domain must ensure that persons admitted as insiders can be trusted with sensitive information and the organization’s security. We look at some examples of counterintelligence vetting, seeking commonalities in vetting needs and practices between armed groups, corporations, and states. We compare, in depth, the vetting practices of Lebanese Hezbollah, the reconstituted Syrian intelligence services, the drug-trafficking group known as Los Zetas, and High-Value Technology Companies (HVTCs). The evident regularities and commonalities in counterintelligence vetting suggest cross-domain and cross-cultural targets for exploitation.
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| 3 |
ID:
181303
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| Summary/Abstract |
This is an assessment of the Trump administration’s dealings with the Intelligence Community (IC) in the context of the presidential administrations’ interaction with intelligence in recent decades. My perspective comes from serving as a civilian intelligence officer in seven American administrations led by presidents of both parties. I also observed and taught about the use of intelligence during the four administrations led by both parties since leaving government in 2005. Before joining the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1973, I had served as a U.S. Army officer with a military intelligence tour in Vietnam in 1968–69—which afforded a glimpse of how the Johnson and Nixon administrations approached intelligence.
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| 4 |
ID:
181304
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence officers love to explain their role in the policy process as “telling truth to power.” They wrap themselves in this phrase; it makes them feel noble. You can see a similar sentiment when you walk into the original CIA headquarters, in marble on the wall on the left: “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free” (John VIII:32).
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| 5 |
ID:
181300
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), although it is a domestically oriented intelligence service, must contend with foreign state, terrorist, and criminal entities. Foreign language capability is integral to countering many of these threat actors. The FBI has developed its foreign language workforce and associated infrastructure in response to the evolution of its mission. This was a learning process for the FBI and progressed from utilization of personnel who had language skills, or who were trained on an ad hoc basis, to establishing a dedicated workforce of linguists. This evolution highlights the need for organizations to assess needs and build toward workforces defined by subject matter expertise, rather than taking a one-size-fits-all approach. As the FBI’s history in the field of language illustrates, expertise will eventually become a necessity. Workarounds, whether in language, information technology, or any other field, will only ultimately delay the development of capabilities.
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| 6 |
ID:
181297
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| Summary/Abstract |
When Yuri Andropov offered to divulge how the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) foiled an important Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation, Julian Semyonov (“Lubyanka’s nightingale”) jumped at the chance to write a spy thriller based on real people and events. TASS is Authorized to Announce … (1979) is a fictional version of a CIA operation involving Soviet diplomat Aleksandr Ogorodnik (a.k.a. TRIGON). The novel confirms Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner’s suspicion that Ogorodnik was a KGB dangle whose rumored suicide was false. It also foreshadowed the KGB’s bogus claim that the CIA was an accessory to Ogorodnik’s murder of his mistress. Andropov sponsored the work of fiction as a subtle way of revealing clues that he had outfoxed the Agency.
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| 7 |
ID:
181305
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| 8 |
ID:
181301
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| Summary/Abstract |
Hostage takings, abductions, and kidnappings with barricades are situations that, due to their character, refer to negotiation, which is a complex and uncertain process. The main objection set when negotiating with terrorists is that it might encourage them to repeat their tactics. But it is not negotiation itself that promotes terrorism, but rather the way terrorists can accomplish their demands through bargaining.
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| 9 |
ID:
181302
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| Summary/Abstract |
Current and former U.S. intelligence officers in unprecedentedly large numbers politicized intelligence in their opposition to candidate and then President Donald Trump. The activists consistently refused, and still refuse, to accept responsibility for the politicization or the damage it caused to intelligence and broader national security. They declined to consider whether a well-established field of thought—civil–military relations—contains insights about normatively appropriate behavior by former senior intelligence officers, especially. This article explores lessons for intelligence officers in the civil–military literature and offers suggestions for revised behavioral norms by intelligence officers in the conduct of “civil–intelligence relations.”
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