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ID:
181755
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| Summary/Abstract |
The commission of inquiry into the events of military engagement in Lebanon in 2006 asserted that Israeli special forces were improperly deployed during the Second Lebanon War. In this article, Yair Ansbacher and Ron Schleifer explore why the Israeli special operations forces’ (SOF) contribution to campaigns have been marginal, using the 2003 US deployment of SOF in Iraq as a point of comparison. They aim to identify and define the most effective deployment modes of modern SOF in war, and explain the changes that Israeli SOF must undergo to enhance future performance.
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| 2 |
ID:
188343
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| Summary/Abstract |
Troops with special skills have typically played strategic and tactical roles as valuable components of conventional military organizations. The start of World War II marked a change, wherein special forces (SF, as they were referred to in Britain, and special operational forces [SOF] in the United States) were separated and played roles distinct from conventional military forces. Recently, Finlan (2019) advanced the notion that since the start of World War II, three unique, punctuated ages of SOF have existed, reflecting various political-military needs and realities. First-age SOF were largely restricted to operations behind enemy lines, aiding the conventional forces. Second-age SOF fought in proxy wars, with and against guerrilla forces, and engaged in aiding political ends when nuclear realities rendered direct military confrontations between world powers too risky to contemplate. The advent of extremist ideology-related terrorism initiated a rethinking of the role of SOF and their initial mobilization to combat this growing threat. Third-age SOF became invaluable in the global fight against terrorism. This paper advances this theory by further delineating differences between the three ages and providing in-depth evidence supporting the soundness of the construct.
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