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ID:
181757
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| Summary/Abstract |
The British Army faces a future where urban operations may take an increasingly prominent place. Despite this, it remains largely unready for any possible contingencies of this type. Of all the obstacles to the British Army being effective in a complex urban environment, the issue of generating, employing and sustaining sufficient mass is both prominent and poorly understood. Nick Reynolds argues that mass is not as useful in concentrating force in the attack as is commonly perceived, but is essential for dominating ground, screening and cordoning. The British Army will most likely either find itself fighting a peer or near-peer state adversary, or attempting to control a population in a failed state, and will do so as part of an alliance or partnership. Other allies and partners will provide much of the mass, which will mostly need to be employed for cordoning and ground-holding rather than in the attack. The British Army should prepare accordingly. There is also a need for a greater focus on the operational level of war, both conceptually and practically.
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| 2 |
ID:
181756
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| Summary/Abstract |
Changes to conflicts involving the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and its design in the Gideon and Tnufa (Momentum) multi-year plans necessitate a profound examination of how army reserves will be employed in aspects such as order of battle, organisation, fighting and support equipment, training, competence, and readiness for fighting scenarios and situations. In practice, the IDF’s operational concept for the reserves in emergency and war situations seems to have changed years ago, but it should be clearly defined and explained to all relevant entities, and in particular to the reserves themselves. Dotan Druck argues that the current concept is no longer ‘the regulars will hold’, as it originally was, but now ‘the reserves will hold’ or ‘the reserves will allow the regulars to decide’.
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