| Summary/Abstract |
The British Army faces a future where urban operations may take an increasingly prominent place. Despite this, it remains largely unready for any possible contingencies of this type. Of all the obstacles to the British Army being effective in a complex urban environment, the issue of generating, employing and sustaining sufficient mass is both prominent and poorly understood. Nick Reynolds argues that mass is not as useful in concentrating force in the attack as is commonly perceived, but is essential for dominating ground, screening and cordoning. The British Army will most likely either find itself fighting a peer or near-peer state adversary, or attempting to control a population in a failed state, and will do so as part of an alliance or partnership. Other allies and partners will provide much of the mass, which will mostly need to be employed for cordoning and ground-holding rather than in the attack. The British Army should prepare accordingly. There is also a need for a greater focus on the operational level of war, both conceptually and practically.
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