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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
181808
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| Summary/Abstract |
Fuel economy regulation is a powerful instrument to reduce CO2 emissions of vehicles and has recently been extended to heavy-duty vehicles. In Europe, truck manufacturers are required to reduce the CO2 emissions of newly sold vehicles by 30% until 2030 compared to 2019/2020. Accordingly, several manufacturers have announced the introduction of zero emission vehicles (ZEVs) such as battery electric or fuel cell trucks. However, the sales shares of zero emission trucks to meet the targets have not been analyzed in the literature yet. Here, we derive sales share scenarios for zero emission trucks in Europe based on emissions reduction options and their associated costs. We find that manufacturers will require at least 4–22% of their newly sold heavy-duty vehicles to be zero emission in 2030, depending on their strategy to improve their diesel trucks. This implies a stock share of 2–11% for ZEV trucks in Europe in 2030. Yet, high sales shares for ZEVs and the super credits granted by the regulation allow manufacturers to meet their target with little CO2 reduction in the conventional fleet leading to low actual emission reduction.
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| 2 |
ID:
192709
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| Summary/Abstract |
Auctions are a widely used policy instrument to support the deployment of renewable energies (RE). Yet, their complex design raises concerns about explicitly or implicitly discriminatory effects against particular technologies. Such discriminatory effects would distort fair competition, reduce economic efficiency, and potentially violate European Union law.
Several studies analysed discriminatory auction design from a theoretical and simulation perspective but actual empirical evidence is limited. Here, we demonstrate the existence of technology discrimination in European RE auctions empirically. We apply a fractional logit model to empirically measure the impact of various auction design elements on the success of two technologies, solar PV and onshore wind, based on 57 European multi-technology RE auctions from 2011–2021.
Our results confirm the existence of discriminatory effects of several auction design elements in RE auctions, such as installation size restriction, support duration, realisation period, ceiling price, and financial prequalification. The results are stable against various robustness checks such as varying the countries included, the time frame, and the composition of the regions controlled for.
Our findings advance the understanding of explicitly and implicitly discriminatory effects against particular technologies in multi-technology auctions and we propose steps to reduce technology discrimination in future multi-technology RE auctions.
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