|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
181212
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In the twenty-first century, China and Vietnam have experienced heightened conflict over their disputes in the South China Sea. But Chinese policy and the writings of Chinese observers make clear that, for China, this conflict is a struggle between a great power and its smaller neighbor over China’s demand for a sphere of influence on its borders. Since 1949, the People’s Republic of China has consistently maintained that Vietnam reject strategic cooperation with an extra-regional power. For Vietnam, however, China’s looming presence poses an existential threat that drives Vietnamese leaders to seek support from extra-regional powers. Since 2010, China has relied on coercive diplomacy and threats of crisis escalation to constrain Vietnamese reliance on outside powers, especially the United States, to challenge Chinese interests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
181210
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 1987, at the 13th National Congress of the CCP, Zhao Ziyang proposed to separate the Party and the State. Like previous attempts at reform, however, this initiative was thwarted and it has been forgotten since the crackdown in 1989. This article compares that blueprint with a contrasting agenda for reform: the centralization of political and judicial power under Xi Jinping. Since 2013, that reform has been accompanied by contemporary anticorruption campaigns and the systematic restriction of civil and political rights. The article challenges the logic of ‘authoritarian legality’ as applied to China's contemporary reform and argues that, without reliable grassroots support, top-down supervisory reform will fail to achieve its stated aims, and judicial reform make no substantial progress. The article concludes that reinstating the separation of the Party and administration is the only way Chinese legal reform can make genuine progress under the existing regime.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
181208
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
How does the elevated threat of protests during sensitive periods affect state repression in a high-capacity authoritarian regime? Drawing on a dataset of over 3,100 protests in three Chinese megacities, this study provides three key findings: first, the frequency of protests before and during national-level focal events and subsequent to national-level disruptive events is depressed, suggesting preemptive repression is taking place. Second, the likelihood of responsive repression is marginally reduced before and during local-level focal events and slightly elevated after national-level disruptive events. Third, contention is intensified when local political elites meet. Sensitive periods do not bring contention to a standstill and costly bursts of responsive repression were not observed. Stability maintenance during times of increased regime-vulnerability was thus less rigid than often assumed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
181215
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Despite much scholarly debate on Chinese employment practices in Africa, firm-specific studies on how companies manage expatriate and local employees and the dynamics of power in the process remain scarce, especially in the knowledge-intensive sectors where relatively skilled portion of Chinese and Africans are recruited. The article addresses this weakness through a case study on the employee management strategies of one flagship Chinese telecommunications company in Ethiopia. Informed by a combined institutional and relational approach, it evaluates the promises and constraints of an ongoing workforce localization initiative to transform the extant managerial regime in the company. The structural and organizational features of the current regime reveal the incomplete nature of localization and internationalization of Chinese companies to achieve full-fledged employee integration and empowerment in Africa.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
181211
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article compares official statements on democracy and ordinary people’s understandings of the term to examine whether government propaganda works to shape the democratic conceptions of the masses. The findings show that official narratives centered on ‘good governance’ have gradually been picked up by ordinary people over time. While the finding could be interpreted as solely the outcome of top-down state propaganda, the authors argue that the mechanism involves two-way communication whereby Chinese leaders have incorporated elements of traditional culture as well as the concerns of ordinary people into their narratives of democracy, leading to a convergence between the elite and the masses. This two-way process has allowed ‘democracy with Chinese characteristics’ to become a viable counterpoise to liberal democracy in China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
181209
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines protest in China and identifies causally how the power structure among political leaders affects protest frequency at the county level. Protest consists of two major factors: grievances (internal) and political opportunities (external), and the power structure can influence protest through both factors. On the one hand, in counties with a more concentrated power structure, there is little separation of power, leading to more grievances and protests. On the other hand, powerful county leaders can discourage people from protesting by lowering their expectation of success, which results in fewer protests. The empirical evidence shows that the external factor dominates the internal factor: people are less likely to protest under the rule of a powerful leader.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
181213
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
China’s plan to establish a social credit system (SCS) has aroused the concern of building a surveillance state. Yet this view oversimplifies and misunderstands the essence of the SCS. The highest priorities of the SCS are promoting economic credibility and reinforcing court orders. Meanwhile, the SCS aims to steer citizens’ social behaviors and interactions by utilizing a redlist system that introduces numerous moderate rewards. The SCS is also more lax in execution than in planning. It reflects a unique Chinese understanding of law, which treats law as a moral guide. This article also acknowledges the concerns for the SCS. Without actively preventing positive and negative invasions in the construction of the project, the SCS authorities will risk creating further mistrust in society.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
181214
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Although Sino–Japanese relations have been on a recovery course, the deterioration of ties in the first one and a half decades since 2000 should not be forgotten. This article aims to unpack China’s perception formation mechanism toward Japan during these turbulent fifteen years by introducing the perspective of strategic perception. Because China’s strategic perception toward Japan is largely derived from its overall perceptions of the international system, this article focuses on China’s strategic elites to systemically trace the evolution of China’s perception of Japan and its policy implications, and to provide a new perception equilibrium that reduced the US factor in the formation of a mutual Sino–Japanese perception.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
181207
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Protesters in China may face two types of targets. One is the target of blame that is deemed responsible for causing their grievances, whereas the other is believed to be obligated to solve their grievances. Upward targeting occurs when citizens whose grievances are connected to lower-level authorities approach higher-level authorities for solutions. Based on a collection of over 12,000 instances of collective protest in China from 2000 to 2018, this study finds that some groups—such as small groups, veterans, and petitioners—are more likely to resort to upward targeting than others. However, collective actions directed at central authorities are more likely to be suppressed. Blame attribution and the difficulties in coordinating large-scale upward-targeting actions have combined to manifest protest patterns in China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|