|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
181914
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
To understand the consequences of Xi Jinping’s rise, one must look down as well as up. Even in the face of increased repression, people have a say over how it unfolds and the shape it takes. Many Chinese pastors are adapting to harsher policies and new ideological narratives by striving to lessen the threat Protestantism is perceived to pose. They reduce ideological competition, by not preaching about politics, dissociating from dissidents, and supporting the China Dream; security concerns, by becoming financially self-sufficient, severing ties to missionaries, and building a Chinese church; and collective action fears, by dividing congregations, avoiding networking, and viewingsmall churches as part of God’s plan. By adjusting Protestant practice and incorporating the Party ideologies into their faith, pastors aim to show they can live with and are being steeled by repression.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
181917
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The cadre system in China is designed to reduce human error as well as improve government efficiency and competence. Focusing on the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), this research analyses the particularities of the cadre system in China’s ethnic minority regions and their impact on local governance. It argues that peculiarities in the recruitment, evaluation, term of office and ethnic minority cadre arrangements have actively and passively encouraged controversial cadre behaviours at the local level. Together with the historical, political and demographic conditions in the TAR, the cadre system has, at times, decreased the efficiency, competence and credibility of local governments. Although changes have been introduced in recent years to address some of the issues, the cadre system’s impact on local governance remains fundamental.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
181921
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the contemporary practice of nationalistic rhetoric in Chinese society through the singing competition franchiseThe Voice of China. By employing the concept of ideograph, the authors explore how the show successfully incorporates the Chinese Communist Party’s nationalistic goal of promoting a unified and strong China to both the domestic audiences and the global Chinese community by relying on the persuasive and affective power of slogan. Specifically, the authors analyze and — two political and cultural slogans articulated in a variety of sonic representations and in contestants’ performative statements. The authors argue that while popular culture products in contemporary China continue to be sites of political propaganda, they are able to apply new media-influenced rhetorical strategies to reflect popular sentiment.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
181916
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
While foreign pundits have alternatively blamed and praised the Chinese government’s handling of the COVID-19 virus, little is known about how citizens within China understand this performance. This article considers how satisfied Chinese citizens are with their government’s performance during the COVID-19 pandemic. It first considers the impact of authoritarian control, political culture, and/or actual government performance on citizen satisfaction. Then, it tests the consequences of satisfaction and specifically whether citizen satisfaction leads to greater trust. Analyzing data from the first post-COVID survey of its kind (n = 19,816) conducted from April 22 to 28 April 2020, the authors find that Chinese citizens have an overall high level of satisfaction, but that this satisfaction drops with each lower level of government. Further, authoritarian control, political culture, and awareness of government performance all contribute to citizen satisfaction and this in turn, has enhanced public support for the Chinese government.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
181915
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to provide a first-cut analysis of the causes of the initial COVID-19 outbreak as well as the subsequent political contestations in which the masses ended up rallying behind the party-state. While the Wuhan fiasco had everything to do with entrenched pathologies of the bureaucratic state, after Beijing took central command of the broader campaign its overriding priority was to contain the virus with a goal toward salvaging its legitimacy at home. To that end, Beijing unleashed its warrior diplomats to aggressively defend its handling of the pandemic, even to the detriment of its international image. Nevertheless, the strategy worked because the nationalist and populist backlash against the regime’s foreign and domestic critics helped turn the public opinion around in its favor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
181920
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The impact of market transition on economic returns to political power in post-socialist regimes has been the topic of heated debate in past decades. This article aims to provide new answers to this old question by examining how the economic opportunities available to former political elites have been shaped by the process of privatization. Based on firm-level data from a nationally representative survey on private enterprises and entrepreneurs, the authors show that former political elites have actively pursued new opportunities in the growing private sector either by acquiring privatized firms or by establishing their own ones. The extent to which they could convert their political power into personal wealth was contingent upon how the privatization process was structured and regulated in a local context.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
181918
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Previous studies on disaster aid emphasize on how aid as gift forms hierarchical relations and thus perpetuates political and symbolic domination. This article, however, highlights the diverse possibilities and capabilities emerged in disaster aid. Based on a 15-month fieldwork, the authors focus on the ethnic minority Qiang’s post-earthquake experience throughout the unprecedented aid and state-sanctioned ‘Gratitude Education’ campaign. This article argues that the moral obligations of gratitude enabled the Qiang’s competition for tourism, education, and other public service resources despite submitting to a seemingly imbalanced power relation in the multi-ethnic region of southwest China. The article further argues that ethnic governance in China is structured on the entanglement of gift exchanges, state control, inter-ethnic competition, and the in-betweeness of ethnic members, which can be problematic yet productive.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
181919
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the implementation of China’s ongoing program for rangeland protection through the case of Nagchu in the Tibet Autonomous Region. The program's three goals are preventing rangeland degradation, changing ‘the mode of pastoral development’, and increasing pastoralists' income. Based on the belief that overgrazing has caused pervasive rangeland degradation, it compensates pastoralists for losses incurred where grazing is banned and rewards them for maintaining livestock numbers within determined rangeland carrying capacity. In practice, in China’s upwardly accountable system, local officials focus first and foremost on funding-oriented task fulfillment rather than rangeland protection. Consequently, the program ends up having little to do with rangeland protection, serving instead as a monetary-payment and de-stocking program advancing China’s overriding goal of transforming traditional pastoralism.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
181913
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Xi Jinping’s utilization of state propaganda since his rise as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. Through a comparison of reportage on Xi and other national leaders and the consideration of case studies from the Mao and Xi periods, it argues that Xi has made more extensive use of propaganda in the People’s Daily than any leader since the founding of the People’s Republic, with the possible exception of Mao Zedong. By evaluating a ‘Xi Jinping effect’ in propaganda, this article suggests Xi has leant heavily on media power to project authority over the Party and beyond. Xi Jinping’s ascent has also coincided with reduced emphasis on other leaders, providing evidence for the weakening of collective leadership in China.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
181912
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao. How can one make sense of what Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party are doing? This essay offers perspectives from the history of the Party and its notable style of rule: ideological governance through rectification (zhengfeng). This Party ‘statecraft’ which dates back to Yan’an in the 1940s and across the Mao period also draws on long-standing Chinese political norms. Xi Jinping is reviving a form of ideological governance in which only the Party can save China and only rectification under one supreme leader can save the Party. It is Xi Jinping’s Counter-Reformation against the reform Leninism of the past three decades and its perceived failures to manage social tensions and Party corruption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|