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LIU, JINGNAN (2) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   182594


Informal political coalitions and private investment in China / Liu, Jingnan   Journal Article
Liu, Jingnan Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract This article attempts to estimate the effects of informal political coalitions on China's private investment. Theoretically, the party-state clients of China's supreme leaders are expected to have stronger incentives to foster economic growth. One way of doing so is to encourage private investment by reducing its political risks. Analysis of provincial-level panel data from 1993 to 2017 shows that personal connections—based on shared experience in the same work unit—between provincial leaders and the Chinese Communist Party's incumbent supreme leader significantly increase the growth rate of private investment. This suggests that informal institutional relations may assist the development of China's private economy by partially compensating for the weaknesses of formal rule-of-law institutions.
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2
ID:   187413


Selection of China's Top Leadership Cadre: the Roles of Supreme Leaders, Factional Networks, and Candidate Attributes / Liu, Jingnan   Journal Article
Liu, Jingnan Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract This article provides empirical evidence to show how the general secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party dominated provincial personnel through their factional ties. Based on panel data from 1993 to 2017, this study finds that the provincial leaders’ personal connections with the incumbent party head significantly increased their promotion chances. The positive effect of the incumbent party heads on promotion did not depend on provincial leaders’ economic performance and seniority. This study further uncovers that working experiences in the prefectural leading positions strongly increased the likelihood of promotion. However, connections with other important top leaders did not have similar effects. These findings challenge the traditional wisdom on the collective leadership and indicate the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party's heads for provincial personnel arrangements.
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