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ID:
191034
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| Summary/Abstract |
There currently exists little evidence on the effectiveness of case-managed programs targeting radicalised individuals. This paper provides results from an evaluation of two case-managed interventions implemented by police in Australia, referred to as Intervention 1 and Intervention 2. Drawing on client case note data and interviews, the paper provides quantitative and qualitative results. It examines client change using a five-point metric and details two individual case studies. Results provide data on radicalised behaviours, intervention goals and services offered to clients. Individual client progress is explored, and the overall effectiveness of both programs examined. The results show a positive relationship between client change and different measures of engagement. Limitations of the evaluation methodology and data sources are acknowledged and addressed. Lessons are highlighted relating to the assessment of client change, program evaluation and the role of interventions in supporting disengagement.
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| 2 |
ID:
182610
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the key terms to understand the nature of violence and conflicts world over is ‘radicalisation’. Sri Lanka’s case is instructive in understanding the various dimensions of Islamic radicalisation and de-radicalisation, especially in South Asia. Though a small state, Sri Lanka has witnessed three radical movements, the latest being Islamic that got manifested in deadly Easter attacks of April 2019. Eco-space for Islamic radicalisation existed in the island for decades, but the rise of ultra-Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism post the end of Eelam War IV acted as a breaking point. The underlying context is perceived as the feeling of insecurity projected by hardline Sinhala-Buddhist elements. In due course, the primary ‘other’ shifted from Tamils to Sri Lankan Muslims. Apart from inter-communal dissonance, international jihadist network also fostered radicalisation process in the island’s Muslim community. Political instability due to co-habitation issues between the then president and the prime minister was a perfect distraction from the core security and development issues. In response to the violent manifestation of radicalisation, de-radicalisation measures by the successive Sri Lankan governments were mostly military in nature. Socio-economic and political components of Islamic de-radicalisation are at the incipient stage, if not totally missing. The article suggests wide-ranging measures to address the issue of radicalisation in the island state.
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