|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
169594
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The March 31 municipal elections in Turkey produced numerous surprises, as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) suffered losses in the country's three largest cities: Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. On the other hand, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the powerful leader of the conservative Islamo‐Turkish nationalist movement and himself a former mayor of Istanbul, emerged with a “victory”: 44 percent of the total vote. Its ally, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), won 7 percent. Yet, Erdoğan's losses extended well beyond Turkey's three largest cities to include Antalya, Adana, Mersin and many others. The results in Istanbul are symbolic: the president's rise to political power began there. He won the mayoral elections in 1994 with a plurality (barely more than 25 percent), promising to address critical urban infrastructure issues including water, traffic logistics and pollution.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
169593
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The current international arena is not only different from that of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, but even from what has existed in Europe since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. At that time, there was multipolarity, at least in the context of Europe. Alliances were built and changed, but they were fixed; “marriage” with one group excluded relationships with another. Foes were clearly demarcated from friends, and these clear divisions were what made it possible for Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), the seminal German geopolitician, to proclaim it was the existence of a clear foe that defined national identity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
169598
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, it is an honor for me to appear once again before this subcommittee, this time to discuss China's engagement in the Middle East and its implications for U.S. interests. It's important to remember that, 20 years ago, every government in the Middle East was either friendly to the United States government or seeking to become more so. While the United States was not exactly triumphant, it was unquestionably dominant. A great deal has happened in the last 20 years, and the United States is now struggling to determine what its position in the region should be, while Russia and China carefully advance their interests.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
169599
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
169592
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Today, with the international drive to reduce fossil‐fuel consumption and increase the possibilities of sustainable development, the use of new and renewable fuel is being explored with vigor. Considering the potential for renewable energy in Iran, the development of these valuable resources is justified to achieve sustainable development goals: economic growth, social welfare, the improvement of quality of life, and the security of society.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
169590
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The prospect of a nuclear‐armed Iran unsettled neighboring countries and threatened a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. To thwart Iran's ambition, the international community imposed an increasingly crippling series of economic sanctions. The regime responded by entering negotiations in 2013 that culminated in a deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed by Iran and the P5+1 on July 14, 2015. Iran committed itself to a serious rollback of its nuclear project in exchange for sanctions relief. In December 2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certified Iran to be in compliance with the agreement, paving the way for sanctions relief. The IAEA promised stringent oversight of Iran's remaining civil program for the 15‐year duration of the agreement. All sides expressed optimism that the deal would prevent proliferation in the Middle East.1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
169597
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania was one of eight sovereign nations that severed relations with the State of Qatar when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis erupted in June 2017.1 This move underscored both Nouakchott's desire to curry favor with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Mauritanian government's deep concerns about Islamist activity in African, Arab and Muslim countries.2 As Mauritania's president, Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz, blames the Muslim Brotherhood “for the destruction of several Arab countries,” Nouakchott is fully supportive of Saudi Arabia's anti‐Islamist and anti‐Qatari foreign policy and has consistently backed Riyadh and Abu Dhabi against Doha throughout the past Gulf Crisis.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
169591
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Roman Emperor Julian the Apostate (AD 361–63), addressing his assembled Roman legions, gestured at captive Iranian soldiers on the eve of an ultimately disastrous campaign against the legions' rival, the Iranian Sasanian Empire, and called them “deformed, dirty and loathsome goats.” Julian's denigration of the Iranians was neither novel nor original. In their long interaction with the peoples of the Near East, the Greeks and Romans ascribed “Oriental peculiarities” in war to race, culture, the despotic nature of governments and sometimes to the physical environment. They often conflated the first two, suggesting that despotism was racial and cultural in origin. As the Western world began to achieve military predominance in the 17th century, its observations became more contemptuous of the way of war in the “Orient”: the Near East, South Asia and the Far East
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
169596
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
As a result of trilateral negotiations involving Libya, Britain and the United States, Libyan leader Muammar al‐Qadhafi decided on December 19, 2003, to abandon his country's weapons‐of‐mass‐destruction (WMD) programs. The first George W. Bush administration attributed the dismantlement agreement to a consistently applied policy of sanctions and isolation throughout the 1980s and 1990s.2 A few years later, Ambassador John Bolton and hardline neoconservatives, who espoused the implementation of a similar policy towards North Korea, criticized the second Bush administration for prematurely easing pressure on Pyongyang
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
169595
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
From the early 1970s until Muammar Qadhafi's toppling in 2011, Moscow and the Libyan Jamahiriya enjoyed cordial relations. During the Cold War, Libya played an important role as the forward base of Soviet interests in the Mediterranean. Although Moscow and Tripoli never entered into a formal alliance, Soviet military instructors were frequent guests in Libya, its military was equipped with Soviet weapons, and Qadhafi was supportive of Moscow's highly‐advertised efforts to back anti‐colonial and anti‐imperialist struggle around the globe. Even more important, both nations enjoyed substantial economic cooperation. The relationship became strained in 1992, however, as the government of the newly established Russian Federation joined the international sanctions regime against Libya. Yet, with the exception of this brief intermezzo, Qadhafi's friendly regime was perceived by Russia's foreign‐policy makers as an important asset in the Mediterranean.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|