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ID:
189035
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the international community’s best efforts to prevent the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons, North Korea has developed an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal since its first nuclear test in 2006. In 2017, the regime tested high-yield warheads, an array of short- to medium-range missiles, and even an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could put most US cities at risk. In 2022, North Korea broke its four-year moratorium on testing ICBMs and added hypersonic missiles capable of maneuvering at high speed to its list of expanding missile tests. Pyongyang even boasted that it can “shake the world by firing a missile with the US mainland in its range,” highlighting the regime’s willingness to threaten the United States with its new arsenal.Footnote
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| 2 |
ID:
182703
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| Summary/Abstract |
The claim that President Donald Trump’s “fire and fury” pressure campaign coerced North Korea to return to the bargaining table has renewed debates about coercion among nuclear powers. This article contributes to these debates by refining our understanding of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis. Drawing on Romanian archival documents and Chinese-language sources, this article challenges the assertion that Soviet nuclear threats coerced the Chinese to return to the bargaining table. Further, it explains China’s otherwise puzzling intransigence when border negotiations resumed. After China’s leaders agreed to return to the bargaining table, they became fearful of a Soviet nuclear attack and fled Beijing; despite this fear, however, the Chinese resisted a border deal for decades. Why did the fear of a Soviet nuclear attack fail to compel the Chinese to accept a border deal? By improving our understanding of the 1969 crisis, this article sheds new light on the conditions under which nuclear compellence succeeds.
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