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| 1 |
ID:
182725
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| Summary/Abstract |
In January 2002, China decided to centralize corporate income tax collection, shifting the collection authority from the local tax bureaus (LTBs) to the state tax bureaus (STBs), for all firms established after December 31, 2001. We exploit this exogenous shock to identify a new cause for corporate bribery, namely, the complicit role of local government authorities. We find that firms whose income taxes are still collected by LTBs after the reform bribe more than similar firms whose taxes are collected by STBs. Such effects are more pronounced for firms located in provinces where government intervention is more prevalent and where judicial system is less independent. Moreover, we find that firms whose taxes are collected by LTBs enjoy lower tax burdens and receive greater tax-related subsidies, especially when they bribe more. Overall, our results highlight the reciprocation between local government authorities and firms in determining corporate bribery.
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| 2 |
ID:
182762
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper investigates the impact of social trust on a firm's adjustment speed toward an optimal capital structure. Leveraging the availability of generalized trust and personalized trust metrics in China, we find that, as expected, when a firm is located in a high social trust region (with either generalized or personalized trust), it adjusts more quickly toward its target capital structure. Moreover, we document that the impact of generalized trust (personalized trust) on the adjustment speed is magnified if the firm already had stringent financial constraints (less-severe agency problems) but it is not related to the severity of a firm's agency problems (financial constraints). Additional analysis suggests that the impact of social trust on capital structure dynamics is primarily through debt rather than equity. Furthermore, we find that when a firm is located in a weak formal institutional environment, the impact of generalized trust on the adjustment speed strengthens, suggesting that formal institutions and generalized trust are partial substitutes. Interestingly, the substitution effect of formal institutions and personalized trust is weak. Hence, the impact of generalized trust and personalized trust on capital structure adjustment share some similarities but differ in other respects.
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