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ID: 193000

Geographical rotation of local officials and enterprise cross-city mergers and acquisitions in China / Huang, Liangxiong (et.al)

Huang, Liangxiong (et.al)	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

The economic impact of the geographical rotation of local officials is important in China's official management system. This study used a zero-inflated Poisson regression model and found that the geographical rotation of local officials significantly increased cross-city mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of enterprises. The impact of local officials' geographical rotation on M&As was more pronounced under certain conditions. These conditions included: (i) when officials were transferred from cities with a higher development level to cities with a lower development level; (ii) when the outflow cities were municipalities directly governed by the central government, provincial capitals, or separately listed cities; (iii) when the transfers of officials occurred within the same province; (iv) when the transfers took place before 2012; and (v) when the transfers happened in the years following significant central government conferences, which provided strong political incentives for M&As.

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Poisson Model ; M&As ; Geographical Rotation of Local Officials

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ID: 182785

Local political corruption and M&As / Liu, Chun

Liu, Chun	Journal Article
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We examine the relation between local political corruption and firms' cross-province M&As using provincial-level data on corruption in China. The results show that firms in more corrupt regions are less likely to engage in cross-province M&As. Further analyses reveal that the effects of local corruption on the probability of cross-province M&As are stronger when corrupt officers have greater impeding benefits or lower impeding costs. Meanwhile, Both ex-ante intervention and ex-post punishment are important channels through which corrupt officers hinder firms' cross-province M&As. Moreover, informal institutions, such as social capital and informal networks can help to alleviate the negative impact of political corruption on firms' cross-province M&As.Our findings show that in the context of highly government intervention, cross-province M&As not only cannot be an effective channel to shield from expropriation, but are themselves highly distorted and lead to significant economic efficiency losses.

Key Words

Political Corruption ; Anti-Corruption Campaign ; M&As

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