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| 1 |
ID:
055675
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| Publication |
2003.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How did Indian democracy avoid the fate of other Third World democracies that collapsed in the face of distributional conflicts, when such conflicts were in ample evidence in India? The traditional answer is that the inclusiveness of the Indian National Congress during the independence movement gave the party legitimacy after independence and allowed it to contain social conflict. This argument fails to account for the persistence of Indian democracy after the 1960s. This article suggests that the pre-independence Congress did not accommodate challengers from below as is commonly suggested, but rather outflanked them by championing still weaker groups further down the social ladder. This "sandwich tactic" has been used repeatedly by Congress leaders during successive crises and accounts for the party's long innings in power, its continued strength today, and, inter alia, the acquiescence of Indian elites in electoral democracy.
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| 2 |
ID:
001827
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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| Description |
xx, 200p.
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| Standard Number |
0521659876
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 042993 | 321.80954/JEN 042993 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
019010
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| Publication |
Nov 2000.
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| Description |
1-31
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| 4 |
ID:
067544
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| Publication |
Singapore, ISEAS, 2006.
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| Description |
x, 313p.
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| Standard Number |
8171220959
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050540 | 337.15405905/KUM 050540 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
022616
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| Publication |
Jan 2002.
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| Description |
77-121
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| Summary/Abstract |
The unprecedented rise of corruption and the criminalization of politics in India are a threat to her democratic regime. This development is not due to the personality of the key figures of post-independence India, but stems from socioeconomic and political conditions: the "licence raj" led businessmen to bribe bureaucrats and politicians to get their projects cleared; its dismantlement under Delhi's economic liberalization policy generates even more corruption since the Indian economy offers more revenue-making opportunities. Besides the impact of these changing economic structures, the rising cost of elections under an ever competitive policy increases the politicians' search for money. However, the rule of law still has defenders. India has a robust judiciary and a virtually independent Election Commission. The "judicial activism" on which the former embarked in the 1990s has certainly made some impact. The Election Commission has also seriously pursued its role of protecting the public scene from the gangrene of crime.
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| 6 |
ID:
067364
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| 7 |
ID:
066176
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| 8 |
ID:
046144
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| Publication |
Chennai, Centre for Policy Studies, 2003.
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| Description |
xxii, 358p.
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| Standard Number |
818604115X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046696 | 304.60954/JOS 046696 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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