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ID: 191979

Noncompliance and punishment: lessons from multilateral chemical, biological, and nuclear arms control / Hughes, Robert J

Hughes, Robert J	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

Incidents of noncompliance with existing multilateral arms-control treaties and subsequent enforcement actions can help to inform the design of future treaties. This article uses examples of noncompliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, and 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to identify factors that have determined the nature of compliance-enforcement actions. The punitivist model of treaty design and enforcement is introduced and is used alongside the established transformationalist and managerialist models to analyze incidents of noncompliance and identify factors shaping compliance-enforcement actions. Two such factors are found to play important roles: the scale of acts of noncompliance and the identity of the perpetrator. The scale of the act of noncompliance dictates whether the compliance-enforcement actions specified in the treaty text are followed. Responses to large-scale acts do follow the treaty-specified actions, while the small-scale acts analyzed in this article all elicit a managerialist response of consultation and cooperation, regardless of actions stipulated in the treaty text. In all cases, the identity of the perpetrator is crucial: the permanent members of the UN Security Council and their allies are fundamentally impervious to punitive measures.

Key Words

Nuclear Weapons ; Arms Control ; Biological weapons ; Chemical Weapons ; Treaty ; Compliance ;
Enforcement ; Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) ; Managerialist ; Transformationalist

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ID: 183210

Review and Redaction-Tolerant Image Verification Using Cryptographic Methods / Hughes, Robert J

Hughes, Robert J	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

Verification inspections that support nuclear weapon arms control treaties can require photographs to be taken as part of the inspection evidence. In a nuclear weapon facility, the host would generally want to review images before they are released to the inspector to prevent the accidental release of sensitive information. Currently, giving the host sole custody of the images for review severely impacts the confidence of the inspector that the images are genuine and unmodified. This paper outlines how simple cryptographic methods can be employed to allow the host sole custody for review while maintaining the inspector’s confidence in the veracity of the images. The concept is then expanded to propose and illustrate the capability for the host to redact a portion of an image while still allowing the inspector to verify that the remainder of the image is genuine. The ability to allow a host to have sole custody of images for review, and even redaction, without affecting inspector confidence in the veracity of the images they receive would contribute to improved processes for nuclear weapon verification in future arms control treaties.

Key Words

Redaction-Tolerant Image Verification ; Cryptographic Methods

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