Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
183280
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Summary/Abstract |
A new, twenty-first-century design of the size of USS Midway with an air wing up to sixty-five aircraft, whether conventionally or nuclear powered, could complement larger nuclear flattops while still incorporating rugged survivability and being capable of independent operations—and could be built quicker and cheaper and in more shipyards.
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2 |
ID:
183283
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Summary/Abstract |
A version of Jomini’s campaigning theory, in combination with maritime special-operations capabilities, offers a convincing maritime approach for contesting Russia’s malign activity in Europe while remaining below the level of armed conflict and supporting a broader conventional effort to prepare a war-fighting environment by using irregular warfare to secure advantages prior to conflicts.
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3 |
ID:
183284
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Summary/Abstract |
Sea powers have many handicaps that often are forgotten, resulting in a dangerous overestimation of their safety, influence, and staying power in a competitive world. A more clear-eyed assessment of sea power—one less enamored of the grandeur associated with naval might—reveals that often their hopes were unwarranted and ended up having tragic results.
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4 |
ID:
183282
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Summary/Abstract |
Rather than waste its money on nuclear submarines that would provide only a single-dimensional response, South Korea should lock down a superior ASW suite by combining new technologies with existing ROKN platforms to provide multiple mission capabilities for less money, including support by existing maintenance infrastructure.
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5 |
ID:
183281
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Summary/Abstract |
In the end, the debate over aircraft carriers always boils down to cost; their acquisition costs are much higher than for any other single-item defense program, making them a natural target for criticism. Combined with a simplistic perception of vulnerability, high costs tend to cause critics to declare aircraft carriers unaffordable—but “compared to what?”
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6 |
ID:
183285
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Summary/Abstract |
While the U-boat dominated Germany’s naval war from 1942 on, its surface fleet played a far more significant strategic role to that point than is appreciated. The construction of that fleet was not the result of myopia but of considered appraisals of the German navy’s performance in the First World War and the development of naval technology during the interwar period.
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