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URBANSKI, KEVIN (1) answer(s).
 
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Feeble rules: one dual-use sanctions regime, multiple ways of implementation and application? / Meissner, Katharina L; Urbanski, Kevin   Journal Article
Meissner, Katharina L Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Export controls of dual-use products and sanctions on respective items are highly regulated in the European Union (EU). However, we find multiple instances of implementation and application problems of dual-use control in the Member States. To explain this puzzling observation, we investigate the relationship between the institutional design of sanctions and their subsequent implementation and application. Drawing on rational design theory, we argue that even if coherence is the EU’s stated goal, the institutional design of the current dual-use export control regime is inadequate to provide for coherence. National licensing decisions and a constant need for the interpretation of contingent rules in the implementation and application of dual-use sanctions are structural challenges to establish a coherent European policy. The relationship between institutional design and coherence, which we investigate in the context of sanctions, is not specific to the EU. Instead, we offer a novel conceptual and analytical tool to study the expected degree and causes of (in-)coherence in the implementation and application of any regime of international sanctions.
Key Words European Union  Sanctions  Dual-Use  Implementation  Coherence  Rational Design 
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