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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
192090
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| Summary/Abstract |
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has dramatically expanded its use of inspections (巡视). Existing scholarship largely portrays inspections as an anti-corruption mechanism. However, based on an examination of hundreds of post-inspection reports from party organs, provincial and municipal governments, central state-owned enterprises, and other institutions, this article argues that while inspections initially focused on curbing corruption, in recent years the Xi administration has used them to advance a wide range of governance objectives. Besides curbing corruption, inspections also promote organizational management reforms, improve policy implementation, support party-building measures, and monitor loyalty to the party leadership. The article’s findings help resolve a puzzle about the Xi era: how does the Xi administration simultaneously pursue both power centralization and more effective governance?
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| 2 |
ID:
184761
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea is widely seen as having among the most corrupt governments in the world. However, the Kim family regime has not always been so accepting of government wrongdoing. Drawing on archival evidence, this study shows that Kim Il-sung saw corruption as a threat to economic development and launched campaigns to curb it throughout the 1950s. I find that these campaigns were at least somewhat successful, and they contributed to post-Korean War reconstruction and rapid development afterwards. So when and why did the regime shift from combating corruption to embracing it? I argue that changes in the country's economic system following the crisis of the 1990s, especially de facto marketization, made corruption more beneficial to the regime both as a source of revenue and as an escape valve for public discontent. This study's findings contribute to our understanding of the politics of corruption control in authoritarian regimes.
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| 3 |
ID:
184254
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars generally assume that authoritarian regimes will not curb corruption because autocrats benefit from it politically, use anti-corruption campaigns as excuses to purge rivals, and reject democratic institutions widely thought to reduce corruption, such as judicial independence. However, I argue that authoritarian regimes curb corruption more frequently—and sometimes more effectively—than scholars realize. Using a novel scoring system for anti-corruption efforts, I find that there have been at least twenty-five substantial anti-corruption efforts and nine successful reforms by authoritarian regimes in recent decades. Despite the association between democracy and corruption control, successful reforms have been by fully authoritarian regimes, rather than hybrid regimes, and employed a decidedly authoritarian approach, rather than the conventional approach emphasizing democratic institutions. This authoritarian approach to corruption control commonly involves power centralization, top-down control and penetration, and regime propaganda. I illustrate these points with a “least likely” case study of Chinese president Xi Jinping’s controversial anti-corruption campaign. At the theoretical level, I suggest that authoritarian regimes succeed in overcoming challenges—corruption being a hard challenge—through their own institutional strengths, rather than by mimicking democracies. This points to the need to reconsider certain influential views in the study of authoritarianism.
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