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| 1 |
ID:
183214
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s only confirmed uranium mill is within the Pyongsan uranium mining complex. The ore processing pathway and the production capacity for uranium concentrate is analyzed, based on comprehensive satellite imagery analysis of this facility. This assessment of the Pyongsan facility indicates an ore processing capacity of ∼750–1,200 tonnes per day. One year of maximum production at Pyongsan would yield enough processed ore to fuel one load of the 5 MWe reactor in Yongbyon as well as ∼3,000 kg of LEU or ∼100 kg of HEU. The analysis suggests that the ore processing capacity at Pyongsan is not a constraint on the DPRK’s nuclear material production and that the available capacity at the Pyongsan milling facility strongly suggests that the DPRK has no need in another uranium milling facility of a comparable size. This report provides an improved understanding of the ore processing steps and production rates of the only confirmed uranium mill in the DPRK, enabling a more quantitative assessment of its nuclear materials production and inventories.
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| 2 |
ID:
183213
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Since the early 1960s, Israel has used the Dimona reactor in the Negev Desert for unsafeguarded plutonium production. Estimates of cumulative plutonium production have been very uncertain, however, because the power level of the reactor is unknown, and there is a lack of detail about the reactor design. This analysis presents new estimates of historic plutonium production in Israel based on neutronics calculations for the Dimona reactor. As of December 2020, we estimate that the cumulative production of plutonium is 830 ± 100 kg. Israel continues to operate the Dimona reactor today, possibly to offset the decay of its stock of tritium. For these reasons, the production of tritium and the possible production of enriched uranium are also briefly discussed. Calculations suggest that the reactor could make on the order of 50–60 grams of tritium and support an arsenal of about one hundred advanced nuclear weapons. The paper also includes a critical review of the 1986 testimony by the Dimona technician and whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu, which provided much of the basis for public discussion of the reactor’s power and operation.
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| 3 |
ID:
183210
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| Summary/Abstract |
Verification inspections that support nuclear weapon arms control treaties can require photographs to be taken as part of the inspection evidence. In a nuclear weapon facility, the host would generally want to review images before they are released to the inspector to prevent the accidental release of sensitive information. Currently, giving the host sole custody of the images for review severely impacts the confidence of the inspector that the images are genuine and unmodified. This paper outlines how simple cryptographic methods can be employed to allow the host sole custody for review while maintaining the inspector’s confidence in the veracity of the images. The concept is then expanded to propose and illustrate the capability for the host to redact a portion of an image while still allowing the inspector to verify that the remainder of the image is genuine. The ability to allow a host to have sole custody of images for review, and even redaction, without affecting inspector confidence in the veracity of the images they receive would contribute to improved processes for nuclear weapon verification in future arms control treaties.
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| 4 |
ID:
183212
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| Summary/Abstract |
Interest in nuclear power has grown in some Middle Eastern states despite poor economics, seismic activity, and attacks on nuclear facilities in the region. This article assesses risks from cesium-137 release and dispersal from spent nuclear fuel fires at Barakah in the United Arab Emirates and Bushehr in Iran to public health, the water supply, and the food security of major Persian Gulf cities. Doha, Dammam, Al-Hofuf, and Manama are most at risk of receiving 1.5 MBq/m2 for a spent fuel fire at Barakah, while a spent fuel fire at Bushehr could affect Shiraz, Ahvaz, Basrah, and Kuwait City, albeit at lower probabilities. Absent a decision to end nuclear power in the region, options for reducing the potential risks of spent fuel fires on Persian Gulf populations include the timely transfer of spent fuel from pools into safer dry cask storage, multilateral disaster-response planning, and a commitment not to attack nuclear facilities.
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| 5 |
ID:
183211
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| Summary/Abstract |
Effective verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement is an endeavor for which a solution is widely sought, but also one which poses numerous challenges, such as protection of information and safety and security of warheads and components. Some or all of these challenges could be influenced by the nature of the hosting dismantlement facility. We have developed a systems engineering approach for use in assessing this aspect of the dismantlement verification problem. We have used the methodology to evaluate which of four broad classes of facilities would be most favorable for verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads: a nuclear warhead facility engaged in active stockpile work, a nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work, a converted industrial facility, and a purpose-designed dedicated dismantlement facility. The analysis is based on the level of challenge involved in implementing verified dismantlement, with respect to five key areas: Verification, Confidentiality, Safety, Security, and Compatibility with the overall nuclear warhead reductions regime. Using our method we find the option of the existing nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work to be most favorable. On initial consideration, a dedicated dismantlement facility turns out to be the least favorable. This outcome is related to Compatibility and depends on the importance of making a dedicated dismantlement facility available in the same time frame as an existing nuclear warhead facility. If this criterion is relaxed, the dedicated dismantlement facility instead becomes the most favorable option. Verification, Confidentiality and Security have less impact on the overall outcome.
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| 6 |
ID:
183215
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea produced weapon-grade plutonium in its graphite-moderated 5-MWe reactor. Estimating the total production of fissile materials provides an important baseline for denuclearization efforts. Nuclear archaeology can improve such production estimates by measuring isotope ratios in the graphite moderator of the reactor. The accumulation of certain trace isotopes in the graphite enables to accurately estimate life-time reactor fluence which can then be related to plutonium production. This article uses the open-source reactor physics software ONIX to simulate the operation of the 5-MWe reactor. It discusses consolidated estimates of plutonium production from 1986 to 2020 based on publicly available operation history data. An updated mathematical framework to relate isotope ratio uncertainties to fluence uncertainties and its implementation in a special ONIX module for nuclear archaeology are also presented. The module is used to identify which isotope ratios should be measured in the 5-MWe reactor to minimize uncertainties on plutonium estimation.
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