| Summary/Abstract |
This paper compares and contrasts the behavioral tendencies between civil servants recruited from regular entrance examinations (REEs) and specially selected graduates (SSGs) in grassroots-level governments in China as they face a conflict between vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (public) responsiveness. This study draws on a survey from 13 cities to explore behavioral variations in the two categories of civil servants. Two test methods (the OLS and mediation model) are adopted to verify the findings. This study finds that both the vertical and horizontal responsiveness of civil servants who are SSGs tend to be higher than those recruited from the REEs in facing the above-mentioned conflict. Four personnel mechanisms are tested to explain this variation: (1) the politicized recruitment and selection of SSGs, (2) job arrangements for SSGs, (3) triple leadership over SSGs, and (4) a fast-track stream for SSGs. Our analysis reveals that only the first two can account for this variation. This account can shed new light on the impact of the development of a separate corps of elites in China.
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