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| 1 |
ID:
185266
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| Summary/Abstract |
Forty years after its occurrence, the 1982 Lebanon war remains academically understudied with the received wisdom about the conflict largely based on political and journalistic accounts. According to these accounts, the war was a political ploy by Defence Minister Ariel Sharon and Prime Minister Menachem Begin aimed at achieving far-reaching political goals rather than a defensive attempt to remove the terrorist threat to Israel’s northern areas. By placing the conflict within the context of Israeli history and the Arab-Israeli conflict, on the one hand, and the nature and characteristics of modern warfare, on the other, this article offers a more nuanced interpretation of the Lebanon War, showing that it was not fundamentally different from past military encounters.
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| 2 |
ID:
192276
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 1982 Lebanon War is one of the most controversial events in Israeli history. The prevailing narrative of this war states that it was a war of deception, a war in which Defense Minister Ariel Sharon deceived Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the entire Israeli government. However, this narrative does an injustice to Menachem Begin. In this narrative, Begin is perceived as a victim, as one who was deceived by his defense minister. Begin had a much more significant role. This article claims that in terms of Menachem Begin’s policy toward Lebanon, the Lebanon War was an event waiting to happen. The main argument is that from the moment Menachem Begin came to power in 1977, a countdown to a comprehensive action in Lebanon was started. The decisions and actions taken by Begin and his governments in the years preceding 1982, paved the way to the Lebanon War.
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| 3 |
ID:
191899
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| Summary/Abstract |
On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the aim of destroying the military infrastructure of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was serving as a launching pad for terrorist infiltrations and Katyusha attacks into northern Israel. From its outset, the Israeli public considered the war an exceptional case and a deviation from the “proper” course of Israeli history. Allegedly, unlike other Israeli wars, the 1982 War did not relate to Israeli security concerns but instead to the political aims and whims of Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon. Also, it is often described as an unjust war of choice, which Israel initiated while it was not facing an existential threat. The claim that the 1982 Lebanon War was exceptional and a deviation from original Israeli principles is the main interest of this article. To determine whether the Lebanon War was a breach of Israeli history or a deviation from Israeli foundational political-moral principles, one must analyze the core tenets of Israel’s security strategy to which it adhered in most of its battles. Using the security doctrine as a guide map reveals that the conflict was neither unique nor a deviation but rather a fulfillment of long-standing Israeli security principles.
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