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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
175646
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| Summary/Abstract |
Based on an analysis of state documents, this article analyzes the features of the evacuation policy of the Soviet government during the Second World War, using the example of the Kazakh SSR. It is shown that material resources were of primary importance, and human resources — even those people who would have been of use to the war economy and the nomenklatura — were of secondary importance in the wartime evacuation policy of the Soviet state. On the basis of declassified archive sources, the article shows that the evacuation policy of the Soviet government on the whole reflected the social hierarchy that had developed and the system of privileges of the Soviet state. The families of the nomenklatura and the higher leadership personnel were in a more favored position, regardless of their personal labor contribution. The article examines the specific features of the material and everyday services, medical and sanitation services, and social support of the people evacuated to Kazakhstan. The difficulties and problems the evacuees faced with respect to resettlement, conditioned by the catastrophic shortage of material resources, food, and industrial goods, are also examined.
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| 2 |
ID:
175649
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The Balkan Peninsula, located in South-Eastern Europe, is the fourth of the large European Peninsulas. The Balkans are considered the least known part of the Old Continent, which has for centuries been the scene of conflicts and wars. This article presents the geographical location of the Balkans and analyzes geopolitical theories that refer to this region. The main aim of the article is to show that the Balkans were subject to complex geopolitical processes and are still a zone of instability in Europe. This region is characterized by an extraordinary dynamic of change, which is a consequence of the interrelationship between geography and history. The post-Cold War enlargement of NATO and the EU shows that the border of geopolitical influence has shifted significantly and that the area of the Balkans has partly lost its former position as a border region.
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| 3 |
ID:
175642
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The information gathered as a result of Russian intelligence activities against Poland serves to discredit Poland as a state co-shaping the Eastern policy of the European Union and NATO. The aim is to reduce Poland’s influence on this policy. The priorities of Russian intelligence in Poland include the energy sector, the armed forces, and allied forces stationed on its territory. Since the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, Polish counterintelligence has noted a significant increase in the activity of Russian intelligence. In addition to classic intelligence activities, the Russians conduct covert actions. Their goal is to exacerbate historical controversies and create the image of Poland as a Russophobic state that is a firm opponent of the improvement of Russia’s relations with the West.
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| 4 |
ID:
175648
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the August 1969 clash on the Sino-Soviet border in the area of Lake Zhalanashkol. These events were the culmination of the confrontation between Soviet and Chinese troops that had lasted many months, beginning in March 1969 with a clash on Damanskii (Zhenbao) Island. A chronology of the battle is reconstructed with maps, recollections of veterans of the events, and unique photographs. Erroneous allegations that have received wide dissemination in the Soviet/Russian and Chinese press are refuted.
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| 5 |
ID:
175647
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| Summary/Abstract |
Soviet tank armies used a form of logistics different from that of Western armies that specifically allowed them a high degree of mobility and the ability to operate deeply behind enemy lines without fear of interruption. The buildup for offensives was provided by railways, and the offensives themselves were time limited, awaiting the arrival of the field armies and restored railway connections. Nonetheless, when used as part of a series of offensives, these long-range penetrations acted to break up the German defenses. The reason for choosing the Uman–Botoșani Operation for this study is that according to Soviet historiography, it represented the first occasion in which the ‘deep operation’ concept was successfully implemented.
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| 6 |
ID:
175645
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Siberian Cossacks not only participated in the discovery of northwestern North America by Russia in the first half of the 18th century, but also in all subsequent government expeditions in this region and beyond. Some of the Cossacks were organizers and shareholders in merchant associations that dispatched ships for the valuable furs to the newly found islands east of Kamchatka. The Cossacks themselves often commanded the maritime hunting expeditions, as well as serving as traditional collectors of yasak (tribute of furs), which they gathered from the Aleuts for the royal treasury. Especially notable was the role of the Siberian Cossacks at the beginning stage of the opening up of the Commander and Aleutian Islands. Indeed, it was they who became the initiators of the exploitation of the islands, paving the way for the Russian colonization of Alaska.
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| 7 |
ID:
175643
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This article analyzes the impact of targeted sanctions (also known as smart sanctions) that Western countries have imposed on Russia due to the Ukrainian conflict by examining the linkages between Russia’s modernization plans for its military equipment, the country’s actual achievements, and the circumstances impeding the execution of Russia’s ambitious ideas. The study focuses on three military innovations currently in development, the T-14 Armata tank together with the Armata universal combat platform, the Su-57 fighter jet, and the new LHD amphibious assault ship. Several other studies have previously described the knowledge-based and technology-based limitations that Russia faces in realizing its ambitions. This article confirms these findings. However, it also broadens the scope of the discussion by focusing on the question whether this Western embargo on the export of military technology, goods, and materials to Russia could lead Russia to a more peaceful or more aggressive road in the future.
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| 8 |
ID:
175644
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| Summary/Abstract |
By employing well-known methods of warfare, but in innovative ways and with the help of new technologies, Russia’s concept of operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine took many in the West by surprise. Almost immediately, Western analysts embarked on a search for definitions for this ‘new’ approach, most of them within the West’s own theoretical framework. These have included the Gerasimov Doctrine, hybrid warfare and hybrid threat, non-linear warfare, fourth-generation warfare, and most recently ‘gray zone’ conflict. Nevertheless, a vast volume of Russian theoretical debates about new ways of warfare has remained under-studied. This has resulted in misconceptions in the characterization of Russian strategy, through molding it to fit Western theoretical constructs as opposed to those within which it was developed. Rather than helping assess the real options open to Russia, each of the aforementioned terms has tended to be unhelpful, as none reflects Russia’s doctrine or assumptions about the nature of war in the 21st century. This article’s main aim is to describe the Russian way of ‘sub-threshold warfare’ as defined by Russia itself. This was done by researching more than 30 years of Russian military literature, case studies from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine built from interviews with Ukrainian military and security personnel, and information on the Syrian case based on Russian sources. An analysis of the Russian military literature when compared to the empirical evidence of Russian tactics in Ukraine and Syria shows that its strategy is multi-layered and comprehensive. It is counterproductive to frame the Russian strategy within artificial frameworks established outside of the threat context, such as Hybrid Warfare. The Russians have their own framework that, although influenced by Western military doctrine, is the result of their own theoretical developments.
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