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ID:
188675
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| Summary/Abstract |
Latin American foreign-policy elites defend the principle of non-intervention to shield their countries’ autonomy. By 2005, however, most Latin American foreign policy elites accepted the easing of limits on the use of force in international law. They supported the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which regulates the use of force to protect populations from mass atrocities. The paper presents a comparison of the Brazilian, Chilean, and Mexican positions in the R2P debates to understand why they supported this norm. During the debates leading to the emergence of R2P, these elites questioned a central premise of liberal internationalism: the idea that great powers would restrain their use of military force as part of their commitment to a liberal international order (LIO). Using Republican international political theory, I argue that these Latin American foreign-policy elites viewed a restricted humanitarian-intervention norm as a new defence against great powers interfering in developing countries. Instead of trusting that great powers would restrain their actions, these elites advocated for a humanitarian-intervention norm that would prevent uncontrolled humanitarian interventions.
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| 2 |
ID:
188669
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| Summary/Abstract |
The contributions to this special issue take a Global South perspective rooted in the long experiences of Latin American countries with international organisation, laws and norms. Contributors explore how the weaker, poorer, and presumed subordinate Latin American states have contributed to and challenged the construction and development of today’s Liberal International Order (LIO). The articles in this special issue ask what Latin American experiences in different domains and historical periods can tell us about the LIO as it now fractures and reconstitutes. The core argument among these essays is that, despite inherent contradictions and tensions, Latin American engagements with the LIO have attempted to level the playing field and prevent the reinforcement of existing international hierarchies. The contributions to this special issue demonstrate that Latin American actors were not mere norm-takers and passive supporters of the LIO. Latin American actors have often sought to hold the leaders of the LIO to their own promises. They have insisted that the rules of a rules-based order should apply not just to the poor, weak or indebted but to the rich, strong and powerful as well.
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| 3 |
ID:
185854
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| Summary/Abstract |
Why did Latin American states exclude a prohibition on maritime nuclear transit from their regional nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ)? Latin American countries and nuclear powers shared common anxieties about the dangers of the nuclear arms race in the early 1960s. Thus, they decided to craft a regional nuclear non-proliferation mechanism. Latin American states favoured limiting maritime nuclear transit as part of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, they disagreed on defining transit and the zone of application of a ban, and they faced US opposition. This article identifies issue bracketing as a negotiating tactic Latin America used to ensure a successful treaty codification. It argues that Latin American states bracketed the maritime nuclear transit issue out of the NWFZ discussions and onto the agenda of the negotiations establishing ocean governance rules in the 1970s. The Latin American construction of a NWFZ questions assumptions in international law and nuclear politics studies about the agency of the global South in the global nuclear order. Latin American concessions in Tlatelolco were not impositions from nuclear powers. Their compromises were strategic decisions that helped them promote their governance preferences.
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