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| 1 |
ID:
173243
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article attempts to fill a gap in research on terrorism in the Visegrad Group member states. Its major objective is to discover and understand whether terrorism truly is a serious threat to V4 members. To reach this goal, quantitative and qualitative content analysis is used. The conducted analysis has demonstrated that V4 member states hardly report any arrests or convictions of individuals accused of terrorist activities. The threat of terrorism exists. However, it is definitely less imminent than in the United States or Western European countries. The data indicate that Visegrad members deal with the challenge of non-Islamist terrorism. In Central Europe, left-wing militancy is almost non-existent, and right-wing extremism, though evidently present in the region, is not a major threat in the context of terrorism.
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| 2 |
ID:
173246
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This article explores German-sponsored Belarusian collaborationist armed formations between 1941 and 1944 as pedagogical and educational sites. These groups included the Belarusian auxiliary police, the Belarusian Self-Defense Corps, and the Belarusian Home Guard. Traditionally, such Belarusian armed groups are analyzed in their tactical and operational capacities and particularly in comparison to their Ukrainian or Baltic counterparts. Instead, this article explores how the Belarusian leadership sought to use these groups as educational spaces in an effort to create a ‘Belarusian’ army. Examining the documentation sheds light as to how the leadership articulated Belarusian identity and what rank-and-file soldiers were exposed to in the non-combative portions of their training.
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| 3 |
ID:
173247
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In the fall of 1944, during the stage of the preparation of the Soviet offensive in the Arctic, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union prepared several memoranda with the proposal to revise not only the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 in favor of the USSR, but also to install several Soviet military bases on the territory of Northern Norway, all the way up to Tromsø.
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| 4 |
ID:
173248
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The August 2008 war of Russia against Georgia, showing severe shortcomings in Russia’s military capabilities, made Moscow realize that modernization of its armed forces was inevitable to effectively use military power as a policy instrument. Hence, a military reform plan (2008–2020) was initiated. This article demonstrates how since September 2015, Moscow’s army has utilized the Syrian conflict as a testing ground for its military reforms. What conclusions can be drawn from the use of Russian military power in Syria, in relation to its military modernization?
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| 5 |
ID:
173245
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is the final in a series of three that examines the Russian Armed Forces’ efforts to adjust its strategic command and control architecture in the post-Soviet period, taking into account wide-ranging shifts in force structure, missions, geography, resources, and leadership. President Vladimir Putin somewhat abruptly installed a new leadership tandem at the Ministry of Defense in late 2012, prompting a backlash against the wrenching defense reforms of the preceding four years. The new strategic command and control system established during the reforms came under scrutiny, but Russian military leaders ultimately determined that with some relatively minor adjustments, the system was ideal. This relatively flat and well-organized strategic command and control system has already demonstrated its effectiveness in Ukraine and Syria. More broadly, the 20-year process of forming this system was one of the most important facets of Russia’s post-Soviet defense reform process and probably the most successful.
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| 6 |
ID:
173244
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes military capabilities, strategic documents, and approaches of the United States and Russia as competitors in the Arctic. After analyzing both powers’ strategies and military capabilities in the Arctic, the assessment is that a direct conflict is not likely in the mid-term, as it could have implications for both countries and for the rest of the world. Consequently, this perception could deter confrontation in the Arctic and, conversely, even could push Washington and Moscow to continue collaboration in areas such as maritime regulation, the environment, and the utilization of natural resources based on communication between them and by doing so avoid accidental conflict situations. This may not only prevent potential conflicts, but could mitigate misunderstandings or misinterpretations that may arise in the event of any accidental collision.
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| 7 |
ID:
173242
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the differences in risk assessment of the V4 states of two politically different but sensitive security threats (Russian influence and terrorism). The comparison was performed using the two latest versions of national security strategies. Using discourse analysis and placing each national approach in the context of both national and international politics, this research shows finds that significant differences exist in the understanding of security risks, despite the same geopolitical localization and comparable situation of the individual V4 states. Regarding the threat of restoring Russian influence in the region, but also in the matter of the fight against terrorism, each country accentuates different conclusions. An appeal to coordinate risk assessment would be appropriate not only for the government, but also on the expert and academic levels.
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