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| 1 |
ID:
169466
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| Summary/Abstract |
The history of the passport is one of the lesser researched questions in the history of post-Soviet countries. Our research is devoted to the consideration of the role of the passport institutions and associated documents of the Bolshevik government in Kazakhstan in the 1920s. Official pass documents, temporary identifications, and certificates of residence played the role of basic documents used in the passport system for Kazakhstan’s Bolshevik government. Regional administrative bodies were tasked with the organization and supervision of the issue of these documents. Those organizations were special departments, pass offices, and local Soviet organizations. Although the Civil War of 1918–1920 contributed to the strengthening of the law enforcement agencies that controlled identity documents, during the period of the New Economic Policy, control of movement using such documents was far less stringent than it would be after 1928 and into the 1930s.
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| 2 |
ID:
169469
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| Summary/Abstract |
The immediate post-WWI period in Europe was marked by the appearance of numerous paramilitary groups and movements. While they were a consequence of the First World War, in the Balkans they were bearers of a lively and indigenous tradition, originating from Ottoman times. The Bulgarian komitajis of the IMRO and Serbian chetniks quickly adjusted to the new circumstances and continued their rivalries as well as internal clashes. One of such conflicts within the IMRO led to the appearance of a completely new paramilitary organization in Yugoslav Macedonia. Sponsored and organized by the Yugoslav state, a group of IMRO renegades participated in the creation of so-called Organization Against the Bulgarian Bandits, thus contributing to the institutionalization of paramilitarism in this troubled region.
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| 3 |
ID:
169470
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article introduces previously unknown archival documents about the participation in the White movement in the East of Russia of the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, L. A. Govorov. Discovered documents from the Russian State Military Archives established that Govorov, after his transition to the side of the Red Army in December 1919, was hiding his role in the rank of Lieutenant by the order of Admiral Kolchak in July 1919. Apart from that, Govorov hid the fact of his voluntary enlistment into the service of the Whites in the fall of 1918 and other details of his path of fighting in the anti-Bolshevik camp.
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| 4 |
ID:
169464
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| Summary/Abstract |
The composition of participants in the combined training exercises (CTXs) conducted by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with foreign armed forces points to prospective, preferential, and priority partners of Russia in the field of defense and security cooperation.
When staging CTXs, the Russian military, along with professional tasks, has to take note of the difficult relations between its foreign partners, of which India and Pakistan are a good example.
Whereas India is a long-standing partner of Russia, Pakistan only recently aspired to develop comprehensive cooperation with Moscow. Moreover, Pakistan is a key regional partner of China, which Russia cannot ignore. Finally, the development of relations with Pakistan balances India’s possible bias toward the United States.
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| 5 |
ID:
169465
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines Russia’s use of Reflexive Control, a Soviet-origin technique to control an adversary’s decision-making processes, during the invasion of Ukraine by scrutinizing daily monitoring reports received by Putin’s aide on the policy toward Ukraine, Vladislav Surkov, a possible political-military command. The Kremlin’s moves in political negotiations are closely intertwined with and supported by its military actions. Synchronization between Reflexive Control and combat control becomes more critical and complicated during the combat stage, as the initiator of Reflexive Control simultaneously seeks to maximize its political gains at the ‘peace’ negotiation table, the outcome of which depends not only on the success on the battlefields, but also on the situational awareness of the enemy (in democratic countries, both the leadership and the public) and international third parties.
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| 6 |
ID:
169467
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| Summary/Abstract |
To determine the personal motivation of military personnel in the National Guard of Ukraine, which has been directly involved in Russia’s ongoing ‘hybrid war’ against Ukraine for five years, two questionnaires were developed, the Student t-criterion and the cluster analysis. The mathematical processing of data was done using SPSS 17.0. The empirical study allowed to distinguish four main types of servicemen’s motivation for professional activity: unformed, professional, compensatory, psycho-traumatized. For servicemen, motives of professional military dignity, self-improvement and professional liability are crucial. This article shows that officers are more motivated than contracted servicemen. The contracted servicemen’s motivation is more superficial, less forceful. Among the real reasons for their dismissal from service, they point out the high level of fatigue and disappointments.
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| 7 |
ID:
169468
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| Summary/Abstract |
Having launched a campaign against the Ottoman Empire in 1877, Russia intended to crush the enemy by one swift sweep that would leave no time for the Turks to recover and for other great powers to intervene. A breakthrough across the Balkan Ridge was a vital aspect of that plan. After the plan failed, the Russian Army was drawn into static mountain warfare at the Shipka Pass. Unskilled in this type of action, it suffered greater attrition to the elements during an uneventful deployment at Shipka than it did to enemy fire in the bloodiest battles of the war. However, this grim experience made no impact on the Russian Army’s approach to mountain warfare in following campaigns.
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