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ID:
193538
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the role of strategy in proxy wars, with the goal of identifying relevant findings to proxy wars. Comparatively analyzing Russia and the U.S.’s proxy strategies in the Russo-Ukrainian War is useful to this end – four major findings emerge. First, a state’s proxy strategy is dependent on variables unique to that state, and those of the available proxy. Second, proxies – the actual individuals or groups – are not singular in their characteristics. A proxy’s uniqueness contributes to the range of options it provides its principal. Third, proxy strategies are not fixed. The range of proxy strategy options available to a state reflects the combined uniqueness of the principal and the proxy. Lastly, in proxy wars, concerns of conflict escalation might be a thing of the past. These points make an additive contribution to both strategic and proxy war scholarship by providing a useful examination of comparative proxy strategies.
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| 2 |
ID:
185911
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the better part of the 20th century, manoeuvre held primacy in Western military thinking. Yet, modern technological advances, in today’s period of limited war, have suffocated the conditions and components that manoeuvre requires to exist. As a result, it is dead. Amos C Fox argues that, instead of lamenting this, the defence and security studies communities should celebrate manoeuvre’s death as a liberating event and begin looking at alternative theories and ideas for the prosecution of war.
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