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| 1 |
ID:
186014
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| Summary/Abstract |
Existing literature argues that the militants and suicide bombers of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) come from relatively advantaged socioeconomic and educational backgrounds compared to the average Palestinian in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Analyzing 2,448 martyr biographies from Hamas's military wing and PIJ from 1992 to 2012, I argue that these militants reflect Palestinian labor divisions and educational enrollment rates. There is thus little to suggest that Palestinian Islamist militants are recruited from any particular socioeconomic stratum within the wider population. I demonstrate that, instead, kinship and geographic clusters are more significant variables.
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| 2 |
ID:
187760
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, I argue that the so-called ‘intifada of knives’ in 2015–2016 was not a new phenomenon in the Palestinian resistance. Instead, it paralleled the situation in Gaza in the mid-1980s when Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) members engaged in similar attacks. What both periods share is the absence of efficient organisational vehicles facilitating a more durable form of collective resistance. This was the case in the mid-1980s because PIJ was yet to develop the effective organisational structures required to facilitate the resistance its members desired, and this was also the case in 2015–2016 because Palestinian youth are largely disillusioned with Palestinian political factions and traditional party politics as arenas to implement change. As these and similar outbursts of violence offer few, or no, principles for political organising for those who follow, what marked the wave of stabbings in the mid-2010s was not the fury with which they were carried out, but rather the rapidity of their collapse. I thus argue that certain organisational principles are required to sustain and prolong any popular protests for a sufficient period.
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| 3 |
ID:
190701
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| Summary/Abstract |
The European Union's cooperation with Middle Eastern regimes to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism has received increased scholarly attention following several terrorist attacks in Europe the last decade. Despite the EU's emphasis on good governance, democracy, and human rights to prevent violent extremism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), I argue that the Union is in fact declining as a ‘normative power’ as it has prioritised a ‘security first’ centred approach. This article demonstrates how the EU's normative projects have, first, appropriated a logic of securitisation; and second, how the Union downplays democracy and good governance in fear of alienating authoritarian key partners in the region. There are consequently inherent limitations to, and contradictions in, the EU's Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PvE) efforts. These conclusions are based on interviews with EU representatives and implementing partners on the ground. The interviews are complemented by an analysis of the scope and focus of the EU's CT and PvE projects. The findings have implications for our understanding of normative powers’ priorities when facing a perceived dilemma of choosing between its security, on the one hand, and its identity and value aspirations, on the other.
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