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| 1 |
ID:
185942
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is based on my experience of commanding the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines during the Falklands War. It discusses the huge logistic challenge of supporting a divisional-size force over 8,000 miles from home without air resupply and without air superiority over the battlespace. This could not have been achieved without the unique organisation and teamwork of the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines. It was the key component to provide the Land Force Commander with the logistical hub of the operation known as the Beach Support Area. I conclude with some lessons from the war, which I believe remain relevant today.
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| 2 |
ID:
185945
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| Summary/Abstract |
The genesis of this article was my relating to a fellow Falklands veteran some 39 years later the experiences of repatriating Argentine POWs, and soon after, taking up his suggestion to ‘commit to paper to add to the “Corporate memory”’. And as I look back and reflect, I see that what we faced was a unique, untried and untested situation for which there was no recent operational precedent. I am not a ‘diary person’, but my memories of these events are still sharp and vivid. And although I now realise with hindsight the challenges and potential pitfalls, at that time it was a matter of just ‘get on and sort it as best we can with what we’ve got’, and yes, with pooling joint experiences and much common military sense, we effectively ‘winged it’, soon hitting on the solution that worked. I also remember well the many debriefs from the hordes of experts that descended on the Canberra during our return voyage home – on the many and varied subjects of battle procedure, weapon and equipment performance, minor tactics, command and control and so on, but strangely, and it never occurred to me at the time, I cannot recall any debrief on POW handling, so maybe these recollections can now be added to all those other official accounts…
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| 3 |
ID:
185943
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| Summary/Abstract |
I kept a detailed diary throughout the Falklands campaign. When I read my Falklands diary 40 years on, I do not know the author. That person was driven, single-minded and obsessed with winning at all costs, well aware of the global and national implications of both success and failure. I also carried an 8-mm camera and filmed when I could. In 2015, I published this footage with the title, ‘Commando Engineers in the Falklands War: Version II’, unedited, except for format and subtitles, on YouTube. It was well received. On the voyage home from the conflict, on SS Canberra, I instructed my officers and soldiers to write down their experiences, which were circulated as an after-action report within the Royal Engineers. There was little debriefing on return. The implications of what we had learned were daunting and too expensive to face. We were very tired. We moved on. The focus remained on the British Army of the Rhine. I left the Army in 1993 and moved to the US, where I reside today with my family. We are all US citizens. Since retiring in 2014 after 20 years in business I revisited the Falklands Campaign as a lecturer for the US Marine Corps. Like most veterans, my memories and views have changed over time, as has my knowledge, not least from talking to Argentine veterans and learning from the US Marine Corps. This article reflects my views today on my very real experiences 40 years ago.
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| 4 |
ID:
185944
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is one of my regrets that I never kept a diary of events during Operation Corporate, not just because it would now be a useful record for my family, who, after all, probably suffered more than I did during that three-month period, but because it has become increasingly apparent that there are many different perspectives on the same event, even when they come from those who were there. What follows is, however, based on my contemporaneous post-operation report as the Officer Commanding of No. 3 Medical Troop of the Medical Squadron, some documentary records – which in themselves often conflict – and my first-hand experiences. Operation Corporate, like every exercise or operation the military is engaged in, is subsequently micro-analysed: what happened; what went well or wrong; and what should be learned. Implementing some lessons is straightforward, but for others it is not so.
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