| Summary/Abstract |
In 1992, Ohio State University professor Alan D. Beyerchen published one of the
most important articles on Carl von Clausewitz’s theory. The article identified
aspects of chaos theory and nonlinearity in Clausewitz’s greatest work, On War.
The article’s publication triggered a spate of further articles and books examining war through the lens of chaos theory—a swirling surge of truly innovative
thought in strategic theory. However, this initial flurry did not last long, as strategic theorists became enamored first of the technophilic “revolution in military affairs” and then the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
Colin S. Gray, remarking on the subject in 2002, wrote that the debate had “lost
the plot” by moving too far from a Clausewitzian concept of war, with some even
claiming that chaos theory invalidated On War.
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